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INTRODUCTION
1 Almost all African countries, and therefore the Region as a whole,
emerged from the 1980s much weaker, especially economically, but in
many cases socially and politically as well, than they entered it.2
Indicators and features of that negative development during what has 
been correctly referred to as the “lost decade" (now decade and a half) 
include the following (some of which will be discussed more fully 
later):
i Substantial decline in average per capita incomes and therefore
living standards continentally and in the majority of cases. The 
deterioration in human welfare has been very severe. In Zambia, 
for example, living standards are now about 40% of the 1970 
level, while in such countries as Somalia and Sudan the situation 
is much worse. With a few exceptions, African countries have
been unable to maintain a positive growth rate of growth of per 
capita incomes for a majority of their households. For sub- 
Saharan Africa as a whole the population growth rate was 1 per 
cent higher than that of economic growth during the 1980s. In 
short, poverty has been increasing and deepening in Africa - 
according to World Bank statistics the "poor" were by 1990 about 
47 per cent of Africa's population and of these 31% were
“absolutely poor" that is at or below the level at which decent 
human existence is nearly impossible and physical survival at 
risk. Even more worrying is that the outlook is grim: according
to the same statistics Africa's share of the poor people in the 
Third World will rise from 16 per cent in mid-1980s to 30 per 
cent by the year 2000. That means a rapidly increasing number of 
poor people in the continent. This process of pauperisation is, 
in part, a reflection of rapid urbanisation in two senses: 
poverty, and especially calamities such as drought and
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Greater economic weakness has meant that many of these countries, 
with a few exceptions, emerged from the 1980s also socially and 
politically weaker.
2catastrophes such as war has driven people to cities while urban 
absolute poverty rose from under 10% in 1980 to a 10% to 50% 
range averaging about 20% by 1990.
ii A rapidly deteriorating un or inadequate employment situation 
defined in terms of low and declining productivity and incomes in 
rural areas, and increasingly in terms of direct open 
unemployment as well as very low productivity service work in 
urban areas (16% in Kenya). Open unemployment is especially 
serious among the youth: for example in Kenya over 80% of the 
unemployed are below 30 years of age and 55% below the age of 25 
years. Open unemployment or underemployment is also becoming a 
major destabilising problem in many countries, or parts of 
countries, in which availability of agricultural land is rapidly 
shrinking because of growing population coupled with 
environmental degradation and in which rural household cash 
income opportunities from wages and non-agricultural production 
are static or declining.
iii Steady decline in continental and most large country food 
production per capita - with overall levels about 6 per cent less 
by the end of the decade than at its being - which has been
substantially responsible for the spread and deepening of 
malnutrition and hunger in general. Consequently there has been 
a tremendous increase in dependence on imports of food and food 
aid and of the gap between total food availability and basic 
dietary needs - up to 25% in war-torn and drought stricken 
countries. For Africa as a whole about 50% of the grain now
consumed in urban areas is imported, with much higher figures in
some cases.
iv A continuous loss of export market shares accompanied by steady 
increases in import dependence, including items of African 
countries used to export e.g. vegetable oils, cotton, etc. The
shrinking share of Africa in world exports has been quite 
substantial - from 2.4% in 1970 to 1.3% in 1987. Even sharper 
has been the decline in Africa's share in non-oil primary 
commodities - from 7% to 4% over the sample period. Basically 
African exports have been stagnant while both African populations
3and world trade have grown 3% a year. The causes are not simply 
policy related - the collapse in the terms of trade of most 
African primary product exports means that "more of the same” 
neither was nor can now be a viable export recovery strategy. 
The greatest failure is a lack of sustained transformation of the 
export base or even of priority attention to systematic, country 
by country studies of how that could be achieved in Africa as it
was in the low income economies with relatively to very
successful 1975-1990 performance records.
v Sharp and continuing declines in foreign direct investment In
fact for most countries there has been substantial disinvestment 
during the decade. This process appears to be gathering momentum 
- driven as it is by, for example, widespread lack of foreign 
exchange to meet remittances of dividends and other foreign
payments e.g. for spare parts: necessary inputs plus poor market 
prospects even more than by political instability or policy 
weaknesses.
vi Disintegration of basic physical. market and social 
infrastructure. Roads, ports, railways, telecommunications and 
post, water systems, commercial networks, availability of bank 
finance, health, water and education services are usually
qualitatively and frequently quantitatively much poorer than in 
1980.
vii Rapid enlargement of slums and severe shortages of housing and 
social services as urbanisation has accelerated. Newer peri­
urban low income areas often have nearly as poor access to health 
care and water as rural districts. And, more generally, very 
rapid deterioration in public services in most African cities as 
evidenced by, for example, severe shortages of water, frequent 
power cuts, truly inadequate public and private transport 
systems, inefficient postal and telecommunication systems, 
increasing rates of crime, collapse in the health services. 
Parallel to this is the rapid emergence of widespread urban 
absolute poverty noted earlier.
4viii A sharp, widespread decline in the rate of fall of infant
mortality - and, more alarming, reversal of that rate in a number 
of countries. A contributory factor and a problem in and of 
itself is the increase in numbers of malnourished children - 30 
per cent or more of pre-school children are now underweight. 
Malnutrition and otherwise minor illness are lethal, malnutrition 
and poor mental development are equally closely linked.
ix For most African countries the external debt has become an
unmanageable problem, a real barrier to any sustained economic 
recovery and growth, and a major source of political weakness as 
creditors use it to exercise direct and indirect leverage on the 
policies and programmes of the debtors. This terrifying debt, 
burden for the continent as a whole stood at about US$ 290 
billion in 1992 excluding both trade credit arrears and a
substantial portion of commercial credit. That figure is more
than two and a half times that of 1980 - may well be the most 
serious external problem which many countries are now facing. 
While these countries are also facing other serious problems at 
the external front - for example in the trade area (especially 
protectionism and terms of trade), and in access to foreign 
capital and technology - there is no doubt that the external debt 
is a very immediate and high barrier to their economic recovery 
and growth, and will continue to be so until the creditors 
recognise and accept that much of the debt is really unpayable. 
Even for countries to a large extent in substantial, 
substantially tolerated default the costs of higher import 
prices, future uncertainties and present misallocation of scarce 
professional time to meaningless "reschedulings" is very high. 
It should be added, as explained later, that this external debt 
is also a major source of social and political instability in 
these countries.
x In many countries, such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Togo, 
Angola, Sudan, the Saharan Republic, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda and 
Rwanda there have been, because of civil wars, major disruptions 
economically, socially and politically which will take many years 
to heal. Zaire, for example, has never fully overcome the 
traumas of its 1960's civil wars and dislocations.. Post-war
5national reconstruction and livelihood and social rehabilitation 
will be needed on a large scale - in fact it will be necessary in 
countries with about one-third of sub-Saharan Africa's 
population. Because of these open conflicts the tensions in 
other countries which have, so to speak, been simmering at lower 
levels of unrest and violence for years and of the inability of 
many displaced as far back as the 19 60's to return home, the 
refugee population in Africa increased tremendously during the 
decade of the 1980's. This has created major economic and social 
pressures for many countries, including even those not directly 
involved in the conflicts e.g. Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania.
xi Environmental degradation. especially loss of valuable soil, 
forests and general vegetative cover has now reached alarming 
levels in many countries. The desertification and neo­
desertification processes, especially the south-ward march of the 
Great Sahara Desert in the West and the expansion of the Karoo in 
the South has continued unabated - in fact at what appears to be 
an accelerating pace. In the 1960’s the harmattan desert wind 
reached the West African coast mildly and for a week or two; by 
1990 huge dustclouds were visible miles out to sea from the 
Cameroon to the Cote d ’Ivoire and markedly reduced visibility in 
- e.g. - Accra for months. Outside the Sahel belt, countries 
continue to experience rapid soil erosion - to such an extent 
that tens of thousands of hectares of farmland are being lost 
every year. The factors involved include poverty and population 
growth and natural forces, especially drought followed, in some 
cases, by floods. The situation is extremely serious not only 
because of the environmental damage already done and being done, 
but particularly because effective reversal of the process 
currently appears so unlikely in view of unfavourable economic 
development prospects and especially the growing absolute poverty 
in the region. There can be no doubt about the strong 
interactions which exist between environment, development and 
population growth. In particular acute and deepening poverty is 
a major cause of environmental degradation in Africa. Equally 
clear is the fact that the environmental degradation now taking
6place apace in Africa is eroding the foundation on which the 
future development of the region, and its constituent countries, 
depends.
xii In the area of international politics. Africa has certainly been 
increasingly marginalised over the past dozen years especially 
since the late 1980's falling away of the Cold War. Where 
external interest is shown, even in the area of dealing with 
humanitarian crises, the style and method are increasingly of 
neo-colonialist orientation assuming as a given that African 
governments, NGO's and people are part of the problem not the 
heart of the answer. That approach fragments and decapacitates 
African institutions in a way worsening the situation it 
purportedly sets out to "cure1 .
xiii As a general concluding observation (although recognising that 
many other points could be made) Africa is now a continent which 
cannot feed itself, meet its external financial obligations or 
the bill for essential imports, protect its countries and itself 
from such conflicts (and their fall-out) as the one now 
prevailing in Somalia. find productive employment for its 
increasing population, maintain or improve its participation in 
the international economy, protect its natural environment from 
the rapid process of desertification and other forms of 
environmental degradation, exert any meaningful influence in the 
international decision making process. As a recent OXFAM report 
says “Africa is balanced on a knife edge".3 Recognition of this 
stark reality, unpleasant and unwelcome as it is, is the 
beginning for finding a solution by the African countries 
themselves to their own problems. In that task they have no 
Godfather. The task is formidable but also manageable on certain 
conditions as this monograph seeks to demonstrate. Certainly the 
alternatives of waiting for something (e.g. the terms of trade) 
to run up or for external rescuers are very much less promising 
and in the absence of African initiatives would at best buy a 
little time.
OXFAM, Africa (Make or Break): Action for Recovery. 1993.
72 More examples could be readily given to show that Africa's economic and 
social crisis, recognised and widely discussed from the early 1980's, 
not only continues unabated but has, in fact, assumed a more formidable 
form with increasingly demanding political dimensions both internally 
(within countries and the region as a whole) and externally. The 
economic and social crises now prevailing in Africa have become a 
dynamic and self-reinforcina processes, with many of the countries 
exhibiting a free-fall situation. The overall impact of the crisis, 
especially of the severe economic hardships facing these countries, is 
now being felt in many ways. For example because of them a substantial 
number of African countries are now in real danger of national 
disintegration. These include more than one which as recently as the 
late 1980's were held up as "success stories”. Moreover, in the 
majority of countries social systems and structures are under very 
severe pressures. This is evidenced by, for example, the increase in 
crime and violence - a clear indicator both of the erosion or even 
collapse of traditional systems and of the non-emergence of new (and 
especially urban) mechanisms for maintaining social stability. 
Ironically in most cases expenditures on defence and on law and order 
have increased during the period under discussion. This both 
underlines the vital contribution of satisfactory economic performance 
in maintaining social stability and raises doubts as to whether much 
security spending is productive in any sense other than temporary 
bolstering of failing regimes.
3 Economic and social hardships have also encouraged the growth and 
.spread of manipulation of tribalism and exacerbated genuine ethnic 
rivalries and tensions. Negative tribalism, nepotism and other 
discriminatory practices based on ethnic considerations have tended to 
deepen, spread and assume increasingly anti-national and disintegrative 
characteristics when people are desperately competing for food, jobs, 
education places, land, and other scarce resources and opportunities. 
Already in a number of countries serious ethnic conflicts, which have 
the potential to tear the countries concerned apart, have emerged. 
Unless early economic recovery is achieved more such conflicts can be 
expected. To speak of danger to national integrity is not therefore an 
exaggeration. However, some calls of danger have clearly been designed 
not to reduce but to heighten and manipulate tensions. That is indeed
a tradition going back to the colonial conquest, but one Africa needs
8to end. Crying fire in a crowded stadium or throwing petrol on a 
smouldering fire is very different from devising an orderly exit or an 
embers dousing policy. This point has direct economic and social 
relevance - countries with low ethnic tension levels (usually as a 
result of deliberate, long standing policy) - e.g. Tanzania, Ghana - 
have demonstrated greater capacity to absorb and to recover from shocks 
than those marked by endemic or rising tribalism. In Africa it is 
frequently tribalism not nationalism which is the last resort of a 
failing rogue or a falling regime.
4 In summary and while accepting that in a handful of countries economic 
progress has been achieved and that, more generally, in some sectors 
(e.g. secondary and higher education) quite a number of countries have 
achieved substantial steps forward, it is correct to say that African 
countries are engulfed in deep and deepening economic and social crises 
and experiencing linked political crises. This process has been 
gathering momentum since the "second oil crisis". In spite of the 
prolonged nature of these crises, and the general awareness of their 
existence, nothing significant in dealing with the situation came from 
the Resolutions of the Special Session of the UN General Assembly held 
in 1986 to discuss "Africa's economic and social crisis". At that 
Session a programme of work for Africa's economic recovery, involving 
African countries and the international community, was agreed and a 
monitoring process for its implementation set up. Most Africa 
countries have tried hard to deal with the economic crisis facing them 
through Structural Adjustment Programmes agreed with the IMF and the 
World Bank which have often involved many sacrifices demanding a great 
deal of political courage. The World Bank's own evaluations suggest 
efforts of African states have been comparable with those elsewhere in 
acting to secure recovery within SAPs - albeit with much less in the 
way of positive results to show for the effort. The international 
community as a whole has not played an equally positive role. Net 
resource transfers to Africa as a whole stagnated in the 1980's and, 
indeed, declined in constant per capita terms.
5 However, it is neither easy, entirely purposeful, nor the purpose of 
this monograph, to apportion blame for the crises confronting Africa to 
2000. There are many causal factors and forces, some obviously much 
more powerful than others. Further, the causal factors include natural
9disasters - especially the prolonged and severe drought in many of 
these countries during the early 1980s and again in recent years - 
which are malign but not attributable either to African policy failures 
or to donor neglect. These droughts have played a major part in 
creating famine conditions, loss of export earnings, loss of livestock 
(which is an important component of national capital stock in many 
African countries), increase in unemployment, soil erosion; etc. 
However, significant as natural forces have been, the basic causes of 
the continuing crisis fall into two categories: first, internal (that
is national) weaknesses in the management of the economy - including 
pursuit of inappropriate policies, misuse and misallocation of 
resources, very poor governance in some cases, breakdown of law and 
order and armed conflicts; and second, external forces, well beyond the 
control of African countries which affect development efforts in Africa 
very directly and substantially. The latter include deteriorating 
terms of trade, lack of access to foreign markets and capital, external 
debt, often ill designed external intervention in African policy and 
institutional contexts in ways likely to decapacitate, fragment and 
weaken decision taking processes. For African countries to achieve 
economic recovery and growth there must be action in respect to both 
areas. Because the external economic environment prospects are grim 
for most African countries domestically initiated struggles against 
absolute poverty (one of the main items in the Agenda proposed here) is 
harder to mount and sustain, but by the same token are also more 
important and urgent. African policy failure and African resource 
allocations - unlike the terms of trade - are at least substantially 
within Africa and Africans' power to improve.
6 Africa's depressing and alarming economic and social condition is 
abundantly clear. Recognition of that reality is, as already stressed, 
the starting point as these countries formulate appropriate policies 
for the future. However, as they embark on that vital and imperative 
exercise they should also recognise other external realities, some of 
them very new, now facing them. In that regard the following elements 
are some of those which should be borne in mind:
i There is now a "New International Political Order" which has been
brought about by the disintegration of the former powerful 
"Soviet Empire" but hardly one of an "end to ideology" or of
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longsighted idealism reborn. In this new political order the 
countries of the West, with whom African countries have and have 
traditionally had the most direct and longest economic and 
political relations, are giving, for national economic, 
environmental and political considerations but also international 
stability objectives (especially control of nuclear arms) 
substantial attention to the “new'1 countries of the former Soviet 
Union and CMEA ("Comecon"). The multilateral organisations, 
including the World Bank and IMF, are doing the same. There has 
therefore been a diversion of interest and resources from the 
developing world, especially Africa, to the new countries. 
Moreover in this new political order competition for ideological 
hegemony has virtually ceased^ (at least for the time being) 
while Africa is basically irrelevant to USA-EEC-Japan economic 
vantage manoeuvrering. With that shift any directly political 
significance which African countries might have had (and which a 
few countries were able to exploit quite cleverly) in the 
previous "o r d e r h a s  evaporated.
ii In addition it does not appear likely that the new international 
political order will be followed - at any rate in the near future 
- by the “new international economic order” which the developing 
countries have been fighting for nearly two decades now.^ The 
outlook therefore is that the international economic system will
This is not to say, of course, that competition for influence has 
also ceased. In that particular competition the major players
include Japan and China. In the near future we can expect some large 
Third World countries, for example India and Brazil, to try to equate 
their growing economic strength with influence in world affairs.
That is not necessarily to be regretted. The losses from proxy war 
fuelling in the Horn and in Southern Africa almost certainly exceeded 
the net additions to development oriented finance resulting from 
East-West rivalry. Nonetheless the loss of Eastern and reduction of 
Western transfers pose substantial transitional problems for some 
countries.
Actually a new international economic order, but of a type very 
different from the one the developing countries were talking about in 
mid-1970s, appears a distinct possibility as the OECD group of 
countries carries out, basically for trade reasons, its strategy of 
“co-opting" newly industrialising countries. However, that strategy, 
which is obviously based on narrow national or group interests, 
should be resisted in favour of a truly global programme of ensuring 
equity and justice for all countries in the functioning of the 
international economic system. Any system which does not also "speak 
for the poor" is, in fact, simply a human in content and inhuman in 
impact.
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continue to function inequitably, unstably and in favour of the 
rich and the powerful countries (or at least against the weak and 
poor).
The continuing recession in the West has meant, amongst other 
things, more concern with internal issues in those countries 
(e.g. unemployment, balance of payments, fiscal deficits, etc.) 
and therefore lower and still decreasing priority for foreign 
assistance for opening up of markets to imports from the 
developing countries and for related measures. The protracted 
recession (and therefore substantial increases in unemployment in 
some of those countries) also appears to be partly responsible 
for the growing and visibly hostile intolerance against 
immigrants and workers from developing countries - for example in 
Germany and France.
iii At the international level, the developed countries are now much 
more involved in seeking to work out more effective cooperation 
measures and systems amongst themselves than ever before. At the 
same time they face serious conflicts of interest among 
themselves and structural barriers to sustained growth which they 
perceive as very serious. This means, amongst other things, that 
African issues are unlikely to be high on the political agenda of 
the international community - since that agenda is normally set 
by the powerful developed countries. Africa's marginalisation 
has been accelerated by a number of these developments now 
preoccupying important countries of the North. The increasing - 
if not necessarily effective - attention in the North to the 
explosive issues, in their "region", currently most horrifyingly 
in the former Yugoslavia is one example. The West's general 
agreement (a) to give Russia - and certain other USSR successor 
states - substantial attention and support in order to ensure 
stability and to promote a market economy; and (b) to firm 
relations with the post USSR states rapidly both establish 
because of economic and of strategic considerations. 
Finalisation of basically Northern economic/political 
cooperations arrangements (e.g. ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty by the EC countries, and that of the US/Mexico/Canada 
Trade Agreement) also have higher priority than standard North-
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South. Clearly Africa has no "godfather"; is not seen as likely 
to cause generalised conflict (with the possible exception of 
North Africa as a source of "economic refugee" migration to 
Europe) and is seen to have little general economic relevance. 
Therefore it lacks both the influence and the clout to insist 
that it be heard or its stance recognised - let alonghat., .its 
views should prevail!
iv As of now the political leaders in the North, and certainly in 
the major countries, are not the internationalists of the John 
Kennedy type (Peace Corps; Alliance for Progress; etc.). This 
means that: (a) politically, equitable internationalism will not
be pursued actively or at least not as a priority issue; and, (b) 
economically, sustained recovery from recession in the North, 
especially in the area of employment, will not be seen as 
integrally linked to sustained development in the South, or at 
any rate not in Africa.
Sustained development in the South is, however, arguably a 
necessary condition in achieving sustainable global economic 
recovery and prosperity. A special element of this concerns the 
environment. In that area at least, all the countries of the 
world are up to a point in the same boat. Poverty has been 
recognised, since the Stockholm World Conference on Human 
Environment in 1972 as reaffirmed by the Rio World Conference on 
Environment and Development in 1992, to be a major source of 
"environmental degradation". This environmental consideration 
should strengthen the basic argument that elimination of poverty 
in the South will become more and more forcefully a necessary 
condition in the maintenance of international stability. 
However, actual agreement on an agenda including inherently 
global (e.g. ozone layer, global warming, species 
diversification) and basically national and or regional (e.g. 
much of air and water pollution as well as of erosion, 
desertification) prioreties; on modalities and costs of ecoo 
friendly technology transfer and of cost sharing will not be 
easy. The South cannot afford a pure, oligopolistic market 
channelled solution with all costs falling on the territory of 
implementation. The North will not finance a total poverty
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elimination and international system restructuring under the
Environmental (or any other) rubric. Negotiated agreements are 
possible but only if international effort is channelled toward 
them and not directed onto rhetorical stage sets (like Rio) or 
devoted to restating unattainable maximalist positions (as both 
eco-lobbies and some southern countries tend to do) .
7 The preceding review has one inherent danger. While it certainly
highlights overall negative conditions and trends, it does so in such a 
stark way as to suggest both that everything is going wrong worse and
worse year by year and that there are neither present signs of hope nor
reasons for hope that the trends can be reversed. That would be a
counterproductive result - belief that will and intelligent action 
matter may not be adequate conditions for restoring development, but 
they are assuredly necessary ones. In fact a number of substantial 
achievements have been made in the past fifteen years by one or more 
countries and sub-regional organisations, by no means always under 
conditions making the effort, let alone the result, either predictable 
or easy.
8 Macroeconomic performance is not a uniform disaster area. Over 1986-90
for example the nine then independent SADC countries had average output
and food production growth rates above population despite having two 
war ravaged economies and substantial destabilisation and defense costs 
more generally. Ghana since 1983 and Tanzania since 1984 have 
recovered to trend growth rates of 4% or above while Zimbabwe has 
achieved a similar trend since its 1980 independence. Unlike the well 
known high performers - Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles - these were 
not economies facing particularly favourable situations. Indeed Ghana 
had had at a decade of rapid decline while Tanzania and Zimbabwe had 
experienced about half a decade of overall output stagnation or slow 
decline prior to these turnarounds. While less easy to pick out some 
hopeful signs of export diversification and growth are also visible 
e.g. Ghana in gold and timber products; Mauritius in manufacturing; 
Kenya, Zimbabwe and Tanzania among others in horticulture, Zimbabwe has 
expanded sub-regional trade to the point at which (excluding South 
Africa) sub-regional exports are larger than those for any single 
extra-regional country and imports on the same basis hold third to 
fifth position. Fiscal recovery is uneven but Ghana has achieved a net
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recurrent budget surplus in most years and even Mozambique and Tanzania 
have in several years been able to reduce domestic bank borrowing 
(albeit partly by augmented external grant support for healthy 
education, water and agriculture).
Structural adjustment programmes do characterise most of the "success" 
examples. But over 1984-90 Zimbabwe's was both domestically designed 
and financed while Tanzania's has always had a number of hard bargained 
domestic elements and Ghana has shown increasing determination to 
develop its SAPs on its own perception of priorities. In short all 
three have demonstrated that clear national analysis is pursuit of 
national goal, can be used to bargain for a non-standard SAP i.e. for
what the World Bank calls a “nationally owned" programme.
The evidence of increasing national innovation in structural change is 
becoming stronger in respect to privatisation. Mozambique - by 
deconstructing conglomerated state enterprises into previous, smaller 
units - has sold nearly 50 to the domestic private sector complementing 
up to 10 larger joint venture with, or sale to, foreigner cases. 
Tanzania - after using time to build both a data and a political 
support base - has entered into a rapid flow of privatisations and - 
more frequently - joint venturisations. Interestingly the probable 
ability of the buyer to turn the venture around (including making 
export breakthroughs) and new or rehabilitation investment commitment 
appears to be weighed at least as heavily as cash on offer for all or a 
portion of the shares in both Tanzania and Mozambique.
9 The nutrition enhancement and poverty reduction fronts also show some 
noteworthy successes. As in the macroeconomic sphere these have not 
yet reversed the continental trend of rising unsuccess, but are
evidence that priority attention plus policy reform can yield marked
results over a relatively short time period. In the absence of war 
African countries have been able to operate drought relief which - 
however dangerously late and/or weak on rehabilitation of livelihoods - 
has averted massive deaths and - in cases like Botswana, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe - often averted forced migration to towns. Perhaps the most 
striking long term nutrition enhancement programme is Tanzania's 
"Iringa" (the initial locus but now covering over half the country) 
approach which combines community participation (including community
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based young child care and feeding) and multi-unit local and central 
government coordinated support (usually for nutrition programmes 
focused on agriculture). In most participating districts severe child 
nutrition has been cut by up to three quarters to 2% or less and 
moderate cut in half while community action (usually led by women) 
across the health, water and sanitation, as well as nutrition and child 
care fronts, has risen markedly.
Women's self organisation and participation in broader community 
leadership (backed by preferential plot allocation) has been evident in 
respect to cooperatives in the Maputo Zona Verde (peri-urban 
agriculture) and in community management, maintenance and partial 
finance committees formed in peri-urban water access extension in the 
low income, traditional housing zones of Maputo. Interestingly neither 
has been perceived as a "women's project" and both (like the Tanzania 
"Iringa" programmes) are part of the central work programme of mainline 
government bodies (in this case agriculture and water), not ghettoized 
in a peripheral women's ministry. Nor are any of these programmes 
primarily donor driven albeit they have benefited from the recent donor 
fashions for backing "nutrition", “community participation" and "gender 
consciousness".
Environmental successes exist at local level in parts of the Guinea 
Savannah and at Machakos in Kenya. Increasing population and 
agricultural production have - within household and community 
management parameters - proven consistent with forest and other 
vegetation stability (recovery in the Kenya case) for at least sixty 
years. In Ghana, in respect to central (though not local) government 
forest areas, a long lease/selective logging contract form combined 
with reforestation and enforcement has the potential for providing 
sustainable yields above present cutting levels; a potential it will 
probably achieve, if adequate initial period finance can be secured as 
it is backed by political priority and detailed knowledge development.
Innovative poverty reduction strategies have been operated in several 
African countries. Botswana's and Zimbabwe's work for food programmes 
in conjunction with meeting 1980‘s drought cycle survival needs did 
much to stabilise poor rural household incomes, sustain dignity and 
provide useful addition to rural infrastructure. Namibia is moving
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steadily toward the first non-racial, universal old age security system 
in SSA - and at a sustainable cost relative to public revenue.
Mozambique's "pilot" assistance scheme for unempowerable urban 
households now reaches up to 200,000 persons at low administration 
costs, with little corruption or faulty recipient selection - albeit at 
a cost level ($20 per household per month) which for some years will 
need to be raised externally.
The point of these examples is not to purport that nutrition,
participation, gender, environmental sustainability or poverty
reduction challenges are in hand or will be overcome easily. Rather it
is to demonstrate that evidence of African ability to devise and to
implement steps which are at least part of the answers does exist. 
Fostering it and broadening it - not least through higher political and 
resource allocation priority, not seeking off the shelf import model 
solutions or throwing up hands in despair - is a necessary condition 
for future progress.
10 The perceptions that the OAU has been ineffective to date in reducing 
tensions averting or resolving conflict and that ECOWAS (via ECOMOG) 
has contained damage but - at least to date - not clearly set a 
resolution to the Liberian Civil war in motion are valid, albeit in 
defense of ECOMOG its record stands comparison with that of the UN in 
Somalia and is much less unsatisfactory than that in Angola. What is 
not perceived so frequently is that the peace and reconciliation 
processes in Burundi, Rwanda, Mozambique, Eritrea and post-war Namibia
are African initiated and operated with very limited outside 
involvement (except relief support in Mozambique) and are progressing 
positively.
In Burundi a Tutsi military president held free and fair elections and 
firmly backed their unexpected winner - a Hutu. With the continuation 
of a national (Hutu/Tutsi) cabinet and phased return of Hutu exiles 
Burundi now has a real dynamic toward transcending a brutal bloody 
history of communal massacres - an outcome few would have envisaged in 
1980. The second Rwanda peace package - largely brokered by Tanzania 
with Burundian, OAU and other African assistance provides for an 
interim mixed government, an end to hostilities by the Tutsi exile 
invaders, and of reactive attacks on the civilian Tutsi minority,
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return as individuals of Tutsi refugees (and their descendants) dating 
back to 1960 and a free and fair election with external monitors. 
Again a real chance to transcend the bitter history of Tutsi domination 
and Hutu insurrection has been created.
Eritrea and Ethiopia amicably negotiated the deconstruction of their 
union despite a history of thirty years of war and have working 
agreement on port, transit and oil refining arrangements. Namibia's 
post war reconciliation - while clearly slowing some aspect of social 
reform - has kept the economy and public service functioning despite an 
unfavourable climate - both literally and international economically - 
and have created a context in which “affirmative action", “land reform" 
and other sensitive topics can now be discussed without the risk of a 
premature white exodus or a defensive neo-racist white reaction. In 
Mozambique both the General Peace Accord and 1993 implementation 
agreements have been achieved largely through the tenacious, innovative 
efforts of the Government of Mozambique and its transparent commitment 
to peace and to providing countrywide access to food and to public 
services. Indeed the risk to continued peace there is the UN mission's 
great timidity in enforcing the accord and in providing the facilities 
for demobilisation (which should have begun in December 1992 and 
concluded in April 1993 but did not begin until after September 1993) 
or the funds for demobilisation and reintegration of combatants.
In governance too there have been a number of African achievements 
perhaps supported but hardly caused by the global enthusiasm for multi 
partyism. Ethiopia has dismantled the centralised, bureaucratised 
imperial structures (as central to Mengistu's regime as to his ancestor 
Merelik's) in favour of almost confederal decentralisation and has 
sought to bridge the so called "Highland"/"Lowland" gap among peoples 
and areas by affirmative action initiatives. Ghana has instituted a 
modern local government system (with significant rural but limited 
urban results) as well as reintroducing a multi party national 
political system, even if the national unification outcome has been 
marred by the traditional conservative, forest zone based opposition 
party declining to accept the Presidential results and boycotting the 
parliamentary poll. Botswana's long running multi party politics have 
proven capable of living with minority party control of several urban 
areas. Tanzania which in the mid-1960's when introducing a single
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party system said a review would be needed in 25 years did review - and 
revert to multipartyism on the interesting ground that a significant 
minority favoured albeit a majority opposed - almost exactly on 
schedule. The governing party has rapidly distanced itself from the 
State and ended the previous policy of funding from the budget. Malawi 
- admittedly under donor and neighbour pressure - held a referendum on 
constitutional change ending the Congress Party monopoly and the 
government accepted the large majority for multi-partyism and is moving 
toward a constitutional convention election. Each set of changes may 
be imperfect, limited and not as rapid as some citizens would desire - 
each process has been peaceful, substantial and dominantly nationally 
generated.
11 Even in respect to sub-reaional cooperation the record is far from as 
uniformly bleak as it is sometimes painted. The Preferential Trade 
Area of Eastern and Southern Africa has negotiated and activated 
successive rounds of significant tariff cuts and not inconsiderable 
reduction of non-tariff barriers. Unlike certain others its commercial 
transaction Clearing House does function reasonably effectively for a 
substantial proportion of sub-regional payments.
SADC - the first wholly African designed integration grouping and also 
the first not to take a common market as its centre-piece goal - has 
also made notable achievements well beyond keeping the sub-regional 
transport network in being in the face of South Africa's total 
onslaught. Telecommunications at satellite and microwave level has 
been sharply upgraded as has coordinated production of knowledge - 
notably n agriculture. Progress toward multistage power planning- 
production-sale is progressing. In 1992 SADC's food security unit 
played a key role in alerting the world to the worst food crisis in the 
century in the sub-region and co-sponsored the relatively successful 
global appeal with the UN. By involving governments - and to a lesser 
extent enterprises - in programme design and project/policy 
prioretisation SADC has built up a stronger constituency - and served 
more press coverage - than other sub-regional groupings. And through
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holding an annual conference on its agreed priority project list it has 
at least to a degree both heightened and channelled donor support for 
regionalism.
The OAU - despite its technical limitations - effectively coordinated 
national inputs to hold a successful 1992 conference on the future for 
Africa's children jointly with UNICEF. In a number of cases clear 
improvements in African national strategic design and implementation of 
child friendly policies and programmes - as well as enhanced external 
support - have resulted as well as a clear boost to Africa's image for 
concern and capacity to design positive action programmes.
12 The foregoing represents a review of the economic situation and context 
- both internal and external - now facing African countries. What 
action oriented Agenda should these countries formulate for themselves 
to deal with the crisis? Before offering some suggestions it is 
important to point out the grave danger of what could be referred to as 
the "waiting" disease, which appears to have been afflicting many
African countries since the introduction of the what are usually called 
Structural Adjustment Programmes. African countries often appear to be 
waiting not merely for the World Bank and IMF support but also for
strategic guidance on what to do. All too often they wait for donor
meetings to be convened to discuss aid for their development programmes 
rather than convening them on their own or getting started with
available natural and external resources. Many appear to wait for new 
“initiatives'' to be taken by the North on their external debt
situation. Several are now waiting to see what action President 
Clinton's administration takes on their problems. Indeed it would not 
be unkind to say that many African countries appear to rely on the 
Biblical teaching of "leaving everything to God" - or, in less
religious terms, the belief that history will, somehow, provide a
satisfactory solution. “God helps those who help themselves" might be 
a more appropriate text as might the reminder that to wait for external 
initiatives, and then cry "Neo-colonial" is less than convincing. It 
is no accident that Ghana's and Tanzania's successful (and by no means 
identikit) SAPs follow sustained (if not very successful) national
programmes and Zimbabwe's builds on six years of largely successful
national programming.
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Specifically with regard to foreign aid, African countries must not 
expect or even wish that foreign aid will continue indefinitely at 
rising (or even at present) levels. Under the best of circumstances 
foreign aid has some disquieting features - especially when the donors 
are former metropolitan powers and recipients are ex-colonies. 
Therefore the sooner foreign aid can be replaced by normal fair and 
equitable economic transactions between countries, especially trade and 
secondarily direct investment, the better. In fact a central objective 
for African countries as they face the future should be achievement of 
independence from foreign aid, as now understood and conducted, as 
early as possible. Target dates for progress toward that achievement 
of that objective might usefully be set - if only to force the African 
countries to be more realistic, to discard the dependency increasing 
mentality and approaches many have practised so far, and put into 
action practical programmes which would create "many Koreas" in Africa. 
Indeed African countries should be asking themselves: if South Korea,
which had the same level of GDP per capita and other economic features 
of some African countries 30 years ago could transform its economy so 
rapidly, why can't they do it? That it had much higher aid in the 
1960's is only a part of the answer as while an important starting base 
that aid became insigificant in the 1970's. And why is absolute 
poverty in South and Southeast Asia declining while in Africa it is 
rising as a proportion of population?
13 However, it should be stressed that any call for an immediate cessation 
of foreign assistance programmes is unrealistic. In the present 
functioning of the international economic system the interests of the 
developed and powerful countries are systematically given more weight 
and recognition than those of the poor developing countries. In the 
areas of terms of trade; access to external markets, capital and 
technology; etc. the developing countries are seriously and 
systematically disadvantaged and hampered. Foreign assistance is 
therefore important until some of these market (or Northern state 
policy) imperfections are reduced. It is most certainly not the long­
term solution to the situation now facing developing countries in 
Africa or elsewhere. To see it as such misdirects attention away from 
the Northern created structural imperfections in the global market 
system. It has been fairly conclusively estimated that the developing 
countries lose much more through trade protectionism in the industrial
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countries plus collusive or quasi collusive import overpricing than 
they get in foreign assistance. Through debt service many of these 
countries - albeit few in Africa - are remitting abroad much more than 
the aid they are receiving. UNCTAD and World Bank studies suggest 
Northern exports to Africa are overpriced by at least 20% relative to 
average global trade prices. Clearly and fundamentally there is urgent 
need to establish an equitable international economic system. 
Existence of foreign aid, even if performance by the donors were 
improved, does not and cannot replace that requirement. Clearly an 
equitable system would provide a more conducive framework for 
development, not guarantee it: developing countries would still have
to organise and intensify efforts, strategies and mechanisms for 
implementing their development objectives. The fact that such a 
conducive system does not now exist makes certain national and 
collective efforts by the developing countries - efforts of the kinds 
discussed here with respect to African countries - both imperative and 
urgent (as well as harder) and does justify negotiating for aid as an 
interim offset to a portion of the costs of systemic biases.
14 International negotiation is crucial - and African state records are 
uneven on how seriously serious negotiation, rather than non-functional 
sloganeering, has been pursued. However, unless such negotiation flows 
from a national, prioretised strategy, it inevitably amounts to a 
rearguard, defensive action in response to somebody else's initiatives. 
"Without a vision a people perishes" can be translated into without a 
strategic framework and a structure of priorities flowing from it no 
social, political or economic set of decisions, policies and practices 
can hope to be efficient in the sense of using scarce resources 
prudently to move toward national goals. To consider each policy, 
project, programme in isolation is "mindless pragmatism", wasteful of 
resources and usually the quickest way to being held captive to someone 
else's strategic agenda.
15 From the foregoing it is abundantly clear that there must be first 
action by African countries in the economic and political arenas - both 
on the national and regional (continental) fronts. In fact in many 
ways the prevailing situation in Africa provides the clearest example
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of the interaction between economics and politics - which is the basic
meaning of “political economy" - in national development. These
interactions include:
i The role of political leadership in inspiring people in their
individual and collective development efforts; both as to their 
perceived competence (or lack of it) and as to their integrity 
(or otherwise);
ii Identification of national issues which would promote national
unity and "team spirit" amongst people of different tribes, races 
and economic groups;
iii Provision of role models in the "nation building struggle" . In
that regard political leaders should not only set good example in 
that struggle but also recognise the necessity of earning and
maintaining the respect of the people - otherwise lack of
confidence and trust will, as experienced has amply shown, lead 
either to violent means to overthrow leaders whose legitimacy has 
become questionable or to levels of social and political unrest 
and withdrawal crippling both economy and polity;
iv Suppression of corruption and other anti-social practices as part 
of good governance whether these flow from need at the bottom or 
greed at the top;
v Creation of attractive national images within Africa and abroad - 
an important consideration in gaining more access to markets, 
tourism, foreign investment and to conducting effective intra- 
African negotiations, coordination and business;
vi Maintenance of peace and security for people and their property. 
Without this no sustained development can be achieved - as can be 
seen clearly from the sad experiences of such countries as 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique and Sudan. Law and order are 
rarely sufficient to cause development; their absence is 
virtually always quite sufficient to prevent it.
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vii Realistic assessment of international possibilities avoiding both 
overoptism as to aid (and direct investment) and fatalism as to 
export restructuring and negotiation of less unfavourable trade 
and debt structures.
The stress on strategy and image are deliberate. To believe a better 
future is attainable is not sufficient to attaining it - a mistake made 
too often in the 1960's. But despair is a guarantee of its own
fulfilment - as the signs of hope suggest strategic goals backed by 
creative thinking and resources which are mobilizable can yield 
results. Similarly both abroad and perhaps even more in Africa the 
flow of bad news has been so numbing that the good - and the
possibility for better - is often overlooked and the largely negative 
(or at best condescendingly pitying) global news media dominant image 
internalised and fed back to the media in Africa and abroad.
THE AGENDA FOR THE 199OS
16 Africa needs a carefully worked out Agenda for the 1990s covering both
political and economic areas. The key question is: What should that
Agenda be? To include everything with neither sequences nor priorities 
will be to achieve nothing - resources (not least institutional 
capacity both public and private) are scarce. This paper offers some 
suggestions on main elements which should be part of that Agenda. In 
doing so no effort is made to discuss each element in depth. In most
cases only a few background and analytical points are made to justify
the highlighting the priority of the Agenda item and the relevance of
the course of action recommended. Obviously Agenda items require much
more detailed discussion in the process of articulation and 
implementation, much of it related to national and local contexts. On 
a number of these items a great deal has already been written; what has 
been lacking and is now desperately needed is a course of decisions and 
articulations leading to action. One of the most distressing failures 
in Africa in recent years has been inability to act either to choose or 
to implement - individually and collectively - known measures which 
would have made the economic and social crisis now facing these 
countries less severe. Action now is urgent.
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It should be stressed that if there is one critically important item 
most African countries do not have it is time. Urgent and decisive 
action, in the areas listed in this monograph, is necessary: what is
at stake is nothing less than the survival of these countries, their 
economies and their people. Delay in taking required action makes the 
task of achieving economic recovery and growth increasingly more 
difficult and also slower. In the situation now prevailing in Africa 
delayed action severely compounds development problems creating
increasingly formidable challenges to dealing with them later. The 
need for rapid decision taking, articulation and implementation is not 
a call to instant action founded neither on analysis nor an adequate 
political support base. Ghana's 1983-1993 adjustment policies could 
not have been sustained without the 1982 rebuilding of government 
credibility and serious attempt to put an alternative, domestically 
financed adjustment strategy into operation. Similarly the 1981-86 
delay in adopting and securing acceptance of a structural adjustment 
programme in Tanzania was the price of achieving a firm political
consensus at home and negotiating enough alterations in standard 
Fund/Bank SAPs elements to sustain that consensus. The opposite 
characterised Zambia over 1975-1992. Programmes came and went with 
startling rapidity and equally startling lack of either domestic 
analysis or political base building before their adoption (or 
reversal). The price was a zigzag policy pattern with no line pursued 
long enough to pay off accompanying and aggravating a much more 
“stable" social, economic and political trend decline.
17 Now to the Agenda. For a number of reasons, including the fact that 
the political situation. broadly defined. largely determines the 
context of and climate for economic performance, it is useful to start 
with the political Agenda. Indeed in a number of African countries, 
better political management, including establishment of legitimacy of 
the state and government, focus on public objective and creation of a 
coherent decision taking process, is really the starting point for
action before any economic Agenda can make sense. This is certainly
true, for example, in such countries as South Africa, Zaire, Angola, 
Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Togo, Congo, Malawi and Nigeria. More 
generally the levels of socio political tension and of incoherent or at 
least inconsistent decision taking greatly hamper economic policy and 
practice performance in at least half of Africa's countries. Strikes,
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riots, crime waves and localised ethnic (or pseudo ethnic) violence far 
from levels threatening state or even government collapse have very 
high costs in lost production, morale and social cohesion. So do 
decisions which waste resources because they are inconsistent, grossly 
ill judged or inherently open to corruption (e.g. money exchange
control, export incentive and health user charge systems are all 
three) .
18 It is useful for analytical purposes to divide the political Agenda
into national and regional (continental) elements. At the national
level the main elements include:
i Sustained efforts toward establishment of full democracy. There
are two important points here. First the democratisation process 
will be challenging, especially as those now holding power resist 
losing it and because many African states have little experience 
either with competitive elections (whether single or multi-party) 
or with parties who stand for anything beyond being a vehicle to 
gain power. Historic African political processes, while in many 
cases democratic, are hard to transform to the present context 
especially after the anti-democratic colonial (and in most cases 
immediate post colonial) era. It would certainly be extremely
naive to think that the process will go forward smoothly without
resistance from those with vested interests in the prevailing 
systems and their methods of distributing largesse. Sustained 
pressure is necessary to ensure success. There are, of course, 
other challenges to the democratisation process in addition to 
this particular obstacle e.g. refusal of losers to accept that 
they did not win the election even when there is clear
independent evidence they did (Ghana, Angola and Nigeria are good 
examples); the tendency to form too many political parties, 
especially in the early stages of the process, based on
individual personal ambitions for top posts and/or regional or 
ethnic particularism; pervasive corruption among the elite; the 
unsuitability of first past the post elections to situations 
involving three or more serious parties; the particularism
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resulting if purely regional parties win a substantial share of 
the seats. But these are challenges, and not ever-lasting or 
insurmountable obstacles.
The second point is that democracy must be recognised as 
something which extends well beyond acceptance of the concept or 
principle of maioritv rule. Democracy in Africa should, because 
of the existence in most countries of many tribes (sub-national 
cultural and political groups) which are self perceived political 
actors and rivals, be directly concerned with the "rights" and 
interests of the minority or minorities and with social justice 
for all. For example, a tribe or a combination of tribes with 
the majority of the country's population (and therefore almost 
certainly the majority in parliament) must not ignore the 
interests and rights of other people who may not have voted for 
the ruling political party. In matters of development this is 
particularly important. Even were privatisation measures now 
being taken were to succee fully, governments would continue to 
play a very important part in the development process - in the 
provision of infrastructure, construction and maintenance of 
schools and health facilities.
Many of these services relate directly to people at local and 
community levels. This implies that there is a strong case for 
elected district and provincial (regional, state) governors and 
assemblies and for acceptance that some will frequently be 
controlled by parties in a minority at the centre. Democracy as 
defined here, involving as it does competitive politics, should 
mean that no area of the country would be ignored in promotion of 
economic and social development because that people of that area 
did not support the ruling party during the elections. This 
point is being stressed because today, and for many years to come 
until African countries have gone through industrialisation and 
associated processes including urbanisation and labour mobility, 
people of most tribes will tend to be concentrated in specific 
geographical part of the country. In the early years of 
competitive multi-party politics people will often support 
leaders from their own tribes. Thus the force and relevance of 
the point being made are quite clear. Even in countries in which
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tribalism as such is not pronounced, - e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania 
- localism frequently is and raises somewhat similar problems in 
central/local governance and the national role of regional 
majority/national minority parties. It will certainly take many 
years in a substantial number of African countries before 
political parties operate on a truly national basis,7 at all 
levels. In the way the multi-party system operates in the 
developed countries, ethnic and regional factors also play a 
part, but usually without the same degree of intensity and
potential for system threatening conflict as in Africa today.
For these reasons the concept of "unity (or national) government1' 
is of direct relevance as African countries make efforts towards 
mature political democracy. The requirements of nation building 
and development in general demand that each part of the country 
(and therefore the major ethnic groups) should be represented in 
the government. It needs to be stressed that during the 1990s 
adherence to the principle of the "first past the post" and
“simple majority" would create enormous problems for nation 
building and development in Africa. Here, indeed, is a major 
challenge to African politicians, constitution lawyers and
political scientists. In some cases elected governments with 
clear majorities (e.g. Zimbabwe, Angola) have sought to bring 
minority parties with substantial, regionally concentrated votes 
into the government (with some success in the first but not the 
second case) .
Another vital point to stress is that promotion of democracy will 
need supportive programmes to create and strengthen an enabling 
environment. In that regard elimination of illiteracy, and
establishment of non-government newspapers and where possible 
independent radio and television stations, must be put well up on 
the agenda.
While this observation is correct, it should be added that the 
emergence of national parties can be accelerated by having 
constitutions which demand that political parties must have certain 
national features, including broad membership - geographically and 
ethnic-wise - before they are registered. Equally there is a case 
against registering parties which exclude on the basis of ethnic 
group, area of residence or religion.
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Healthy competitive politics requires parties with capacities to 
organise, to devise policies, to monitor events, to communicate. 
That requires money. Mass membership dues are not a strong 
source in Africa; finance by millionaire candidates or businesses 
is a less than happy one. State finance based roughly on votes 
received plus a minimum base grant for all parties winning 5% or 
more of votes might offer a partial answer. More generally it 
should be recognised that there are some important economic 
implications in relation to the transition to democracy (not only 
in Africa but also elsewhere as we have seen in such countries as 
Russia). In particular it is clear that political reform will 
not be easily sustainable without adequate and sustained 
performance in the economic field. While it is readily evident 
that in some cases political reform is the starting point for 
achieving economic recovery and growth, it must also be stressed 
very strongly that without better economic performance (which 
would be more easily achievable if there is support from outside 
for example through debt relief), many of the political reforms 
now being undertaken will falter. Chronic economic unsuccess is 
a formula for loosing elections: cargo cult populism all too 
often one for opposition victories. That is the road either to 
incoherent and unstable policies or to cynicism with platforms 
(or both). The chaotic Polish political scene and the declining 
proportion of eligible votes cast illustrate that this is a 
danger which is not unique to Africa. If the rest of the world 
wants to assist African countries in their political reforms it 
must recognise that rapid achievement of economic recovery and 
growth in these countries, is one of the crucial necessary 
conditions for deepening and sustaining democracy as well as for 
broadening market and investment opportunity potential.
ii From what has already been said it is obvious that African 
countries must make deliberate and sustained efforts to deal with 
the problems of tribalism and localism - using such devices 
affirmative action in public employment policies; enrolment in 
schools; use of the "official" language within government and 
public institutions; imaginative and supportive use of radio and 
television; decentralised systems of authority and accountability 
to ensure that at district levels there is direct participation
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in governance and administration; etc. This is particularly key 
where past history has built up both barriers and inequitable 
inclusion/exclusion patterns e.g. against "Lowlanders“ in 
Ethiopia, Muslims in East Africa, nomadic pastoralists in some 
parts of the Sahel and cultivators in others. "Affirmative 
action" broadly defined and focused on providing access to 
inclusion (not barriers to exclude) is part of the answer and one 
which can be effective only in the context of rising overall 
resource availability. The efforts should also include
deliberate and imaginative ways of promoting patriotism and 
nationalism - but in a broad not a narrow sense.
iii Suppression of corruption and other undesirable economic and 
social practices. It is an inescapable fact that in many 
countries corruption is so pervasive and damaging to good
governance as to be a most serious problem requiring immediate 
action. Obviously those involved, especially those in high 
places who view public office as primarily a source of private 
gain, will do their utmost to hid or even justify and to 
perpetuate the practice. But corruption has become such a major 
barrier to development that its elimination is one of the 
necessary conditions in achievement of economic recovery and
growth in Africa. Corruption, creates an environment which is 
hostile to domestic and foreign investment; it generates loss of 
faith and confidence by the people in the public service; it
appears strongly associated with increased crime and political 
intolerance and victimisation; it leads at best to higher costs 
and at worst to policies or projects whose only "justification" 
is the maximisation of payoffs. Corruption must therefore be 
fought with all available force.
This is especially true at the top. In the first place this is 
the level at which naked greed is the driving force and at which 
serious misallocations of resources to inferior projects and 
policies as well as massive losses (from bribes, from higher
project costs, from inferior product supply, from institutional 
weakening or fraudulent institution cover-ups e.g. in banking). 
Second, a pattern of top corruption makes ending lower level 
corruption impossible. Indeed higher level corruption breeds
30
lower level because it creates a massive number of allies for 
corruption - the system President Rawlings bitterly termed 
"chopping off the backside" which totally polluted Ghanaian 
public morality after 1983 especially over 1979-81.
In fighting corruption it should be realised that disciplinary 
action by itself is not sufficient. Inappropriate wage and 
salary policies which fail to recognise cost of living realities 
can contribute significantly to growth and deepening of 
corruption. If the employees are compelled, of necessity, to 
look for I or devise!) wavs of supplementing their inadequate 
wages or salaries they will. To pay a health officer $20 a month 
and ask her to collect cash fees of $0.15 for transmission is 
quite clearly to lead her into temptation. The same is true of a 
customs officer paid $30 a month and supposed to levy duty of 
$1,000 a day. In some cases - e.g. postal clerks who use their 
"salaries" to get to and from work and then charge $0.10 an item 
to put on stamps and see it is actually posted - what one really 
has are decentralised, privatised user fees/incentive bonuses but 
ones rather inferior to an honest day's pay.
It should also be recognised that quite often corruption is 
initiated by foreigners - machinery suppliers; investors in
projects; organisers of military sales; etc. In fact some
bilateral aid programmes have been accompanied by large scale
corruption in the donor countries, with the added costs going to 
the recipient country's account. Corruption in the donor
countries has also been responsible for implementation of very 
low priority projects in Africa - and elsewhere. In that respect 
the lobby groups in the North seeking to highlight the Northern 
role in corrupting and to seek general adoption and enforcement 
of USA type anti-bribe giving legislation are to be welcomed. By 
the same token those - North or South - who wrongly explain 
bribery as a traditional African custom which should be accepted 
are to be deplored.
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Nepotism - broadly defined is a related problem whether
familial, broader clan based or political. It has somewhat 
better claims to traditional (including during the colonial era) 
status but is incompatible with either efficient governance or 
nation building. In this case an approach broader than public 
sector is needed: unless most enterprises and virtually all
public sector entities can be seen to hire, train, promote (and 
fire) on the basis of merit (and its absence) all managers and 
politicians will be under severe pressure to "look after your 
own". And unless merit employment practices are accompanied by 
clear-cut, enforced affirmative action guidelines to ensure women 
and previously disadvantaged community members do have a chance 
the few managers who are women or from these groups will be under 
truly intolerable pressure to run personal "affirmative action" 
programmes via nepotism.
iv Full commitment to peace and social justice - comprehensively to
include national solidarity. That commitment should include 
publicly announced and active programmes in key areas: full
respect and protection for an independent judiciary; properly 
conducted and effectively supervised law enforcement agencies; 
education of people about their rights; political tolerance and 
accommodation; etc. It is totally unacceptable that in some 
African countries civil strife and armed conflicts, often due to
political intolerance based on exploitation of ethnic fears by
unscrupulous leaders determined to achieve or hang on to power, 
have led and continue to lead to the death of many hundreds of
thousands and to the creation of a huge refugee population of at
a minimum six million - a population larger than that of many 
African countries. The OAU and African states no longer have the 
soft option of turning blind eyes on the grounds there are 
“internal affairs". First they spill across boundaries; second 
they make cooperation very hard; third they destroy the external 
image of all of Africa.
v The situation of the public service and of public servants in
many African countries is now appalling: misguided political
objectives have led to massive increases in employment which, in 
turn, means that (i) wages and salaries are low and, very
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significant, a small and declining proportion of those paid in 
the private sector; (ii) substantial increases in salaries and 
wages cannot be made because of budgetary implications, 
especially since those items and related payments account for 
upwards of 75% of recurrent budget in health and education 
ministries in many African countries; (iii) public employees do 
not have supporting facilities (e.g. vehicles, typewriters, etc.) 
in their work (since most of the money received from the Treasury 
is spent on salaries and wages); and (iv) the quality of
personnel in public service declines steadily as those with 
higher "market value" join the private sector; etc. In African 
countries public service employment is often more than 50% of 
recorded wage employment while wages, salaries and other 
personnel costs take up to half all recurrent expenditures, 
quality and often quantity of services provided are deteriorating 
and that new employment opportunities are no where near enough 
for the increasing labour force, especially the young and
educated. Those facts make public service reform a major 
political challenge in Africa. Clearly, it is both necessary and 
urgently required.
It would be imprudent as well as unrealistic not to refer to the 
“advice" which African countries are now being given about 
establishing and upholding "good governance". The advice is, 
without doubt, timely (although its foreign advocates are not 
themselves always practising what they say nor being all that 
consistent on which African states' suppression of pluralism and 
destabilisation of neighbours they tolerate). Good governance 
should be seen as something which extends well beyond democracy, 
respect of human rights and suppression of corruption. It 
includes what is now referred to as “transparency and 
accountability" in all public actions and programmes, and 
establishment of political "legitimacy". While not limited to 
accounts and audits which are both independent and publicly 
available it does require them as a data base. It should also 
include establishment of public confidence that agreed decisions 
or measures taken to, say, promote investment or to move to
universal access to primary health care will be upheld and not
changed arbitrarily without consultation. This is a particularly
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important point as far as private investors are concerned but 
equally to electorates expected to take politicians and
governments seriously. In general and although the situation 
varies, it is correct to urge that in all African countries
action needs to be taken to ensure that the necessary 
administrative structures, systems and procedures are in place to 
guarantee and uphold "good governance” as broadly defined here.
vi Restructuring of governance - and the civil service - to relate 
to priority agenda items in respect to services, decentralisation 
to local government and public involvement through
accountability/transparency. Civil service reform should not be 
seen merely as an exercise in cost control or employment
reduction. In fact World Bank projections to 2000 suggest most 
African states need more (and more effective) public servants but 
not necessarily all the ones they have now. Similarly local 
governance ruled by centrally appointed administrators is a 
colonial hangover hardly suited to genuine decentralisation or 
community participation.
vii Development of non-governmental organisations and other voluntary 
institutions. These play an important role in promoting 
participatory development and encouragement of initiatives at all 
levels - which is the central style/strategy needed to deal with 
the challenges of the 1990s. The important of participatory 
development cannot be exaggerated, especially when it is realised 
that the process of economic recovery and growth will involve 
sacrifices for everyone. People's "ownership" of the various 
programmes aimed towards that objective is therefore an essential 
ingredient in ensuring successful implementation of those 
programmes. Very clearly this reality has important implications 
for the manner in which those programmes are formulated. NGO's 
are not able to work with totally centralised, highly 
bureaucratised approaches.
viii Community participation - however defined - will not work (and 
does not deserve to work) if defined simply as a means to pass 
the costs of basic services from the state to the user - the 
initial Ministry of Finance/World Bank reading of the "Bamako
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Initiative“ on primary health care. Users will indeed
participate in financing better service provision but normally 
only if they have a real sav in service design and budgeting, in
how their additional funds will be used, in reviewing performance
and in structuring £he levels-types-allocation among users of
payments. Both prudent pursuit of the possible and good, 
democratic governance point in that direction. Rigid, centrally 
set fees - whether collected from individual users or "community 
groups" set up as modern day tax formers to collect them which 
are then largely remitted to the centre (as all too often 
proposed and attempted in respect to primary health care and 
education) are a parody both of community participation and of 
equitable expansion of access to services.
ix Deliberate efforts to educate and convince people of the 
imperative need for economic/political cooperation with 
neighbouring countries. This is the main consideration behind 
the recommendation that promotion of patriotism and nationalism 
at the country level should not be carried out in a narrow 
fashion: it should be within the framework of African solidarity 
- Pan-Africanism. Cooperation amongst African countries, on the 
scale and degree needed, will not be achieved without political 
education and motivation of the people to believe that their 
individual and collective interests will be more effectively 
promoted and safeguarded through such cooperation. In this area 
African countries should learn from, for example, some of the 
programmes being pursued within the European Community and from 
the European Movement's persistent public presentation of 
European cooperation and unity themes from the 1950's onward - as 
well as from the problems ensuing on failure to pursue that 
approach in respect to the Maastricht Treaty.
x Practical incorporation of gender issues in programme, policy and 
project design by main operational units not their ghettoisation 
in underfunded, weak "women's" or "community development" 
ministries. The realities of household responsibilities and 
gender divisions of labour mean that failure to do so is 
economically as well as socially expensive not least in respect 
to nutrition, child survival, water system maintenance and
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management and population policy (in respect to which too little 
attention has been given to education directed to men).
xi Articulated action programmes directed to main environmental 
challenges. This is - or should not be - seen as a bow to 
Northern environmental lobbies. The chief victims of 
desertification. neo-desertification. forest destruction. soil 
erosion, air and water pollution, etc. in Africa are Africans and 
especially poor Africans. Their continued advance will greatly 
damage the inheritance and limit the opportunities this 
generation passes on to its children and grandchildren. 
Similarly wildlife and wilderness protection has very concrete 
macroeconomic and regional value to Africa and Africans 
tourism, whatever its disadvantages, is one of the less 
unpromising exports in a substantial number of countries.
xii Priority attention to reducing absolute poverty, especially by 
enabling poor people to produce more. In a number of countries - 
e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania, Malawi, Sudan - no macroeconomic 
growth or export strategy which does not do this to some point 
has much chance of promoting sustainably high growth rates either 
of output or of earned import capacity. Even in cases in which 
macro effects will be much less crucial - e.g. Namibia, Angola - 
adequate livelihood generation requires enabling poor households
especially those in the family small farming sector - to 
produce more.
xiii Recognising that growth matters - in exports and government 
revenues in livelihoods and human/social investment (i.e. health- 
education-water) as well as in total output (i.e. GDP). All 
objectives require allocation of real resources. Therefore, a 
rising level of real resource availability is a necessary. even 
if rarely a sufficient, condition for development however 
defined. Growth without development is possible even if 
undesirable; in poor countries development without growth is 
neither desirable nor possible.
xiv Arrangements of effective and beneficial diplomatic relations 
with other countries and in particular African countries. 
Establishment of diplomatic missions should be sen as an
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investment requiring its own acceptable "rate of return" in the 
development of the nation. This has, fairly clearly important 
implications in the selection of countries in which to establish 
diplomatic missions and the staffing, especially technically and 
skill-wise, of those missions. Looking at the situation today in 
those terms many African countries are over-represented abroad. 
It is therefore welcome that quite a few of them have been 
reducing their foreign missions, sensibly but one suspects 
largely due to lack of foreign exchange. African countries 
should also cooperate in this field, e.g. through having joint 
missions, since many of them do not have the financial and 
manpower resources to achieve satisfactory performance in this 
important sector. In particular few African countries can - on 
their own - staff negotiating teams for major conferences e.g. 
Rio Environment, GATT Uruguay Round, UN Agency annual meetings, 
Law of the Sea follow up, 1995 Social. Pooling could greatly 
increase negotiating capacity and influence outcomes in 
directions favourable to Africa, as happened to a degree in the 
Law of the Sea negotiating process.
xv Preparation for more effective negotiations with multilateral 
institutions (especially the World Bank, IMF and EEC) with other 
countries and with investors is crucial. Instead of ad hoc 
arrangements and procedures which have often been employed so far 
- and which often mean that African countries go to meetings 
without their own carefully prepared proposals, perforce to 
listen or at best to make statements of principle they have no 
capacity to articulate and to relate to particular negotiating 
contexts. Technical competence is a problem - unfortunately not 
always recognised let alone accepted as such.® Clearly better 
national staffing and back-up is part of the answer, but so are 
joint multi-country technical teams and systematic use of ECA, 
ADB and UNCTAD to do applied studies relating to specific issues 
and to concrete potential negotiating strategies.
Lack of prior preparation and, at times, technical competence 
increases the power and influence of the World Bank and IMF in 
"negotiations" with African countries - since it is often basically 
the proposals of the two institutions which are discussed, and these 
are articulated and "recommended" by experienced bureaucrats and 
technicians. The situation is at times made worse by the fear that 
assistance may not be forthcoming if a country argues too much.
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19 At the regional (and sub regional) level the political Agenda needs to
include:
i Promotion of economic cooperation among African countries should 
be one of the major political goals in the region. In that 
connection and as already stressed, political preparation of the 
people of these countries for such cooperation is a necessary 
prerequisite. As the regional level action should include the 
necessary political accommodation and active pursuit of 
appropriate programmes by regional organisations, especially OAU, 
ECA and ADB, and sub-regional ones e.g. ECOWAS PTA, SADC, ECCA 
(Central Africa).
ii Related to (i) above there should be political efforts to promote
supra-state nationalism i.e. the Pan-Africanism of the pre­
independence days. There is no doubt that the Pan-African 
movement contributed a great deal in sustaining struggle for 
liberation in a number of countries. The same kind of spirit and 
vision are needed today. African countries should learn from the 
other regions, including the developed countries, the importance 
of promoting supra-state cohesion and togetherness. Above all 
African countries should recognise that collective sovereignty is 
both stronger than and consistent with national sovereignty: it
actually helps guarantee the latter.
iii Elimination of social and political upheavals, especially armed 
conflicts, which both destabilise regional relations directly and 
by loosing hosts of refugees: e.g. the conflicts in Liberia, 
Angola, Sudan, Zaire, Togo, Sahara Democratic Republic, Somalia, 
Uganda, and Rwanda and the refugee and destabilisation spillover 
in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Namibia, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Benin, Sierra Leone and Algeria. 
Establishment of an effective African peace keeping and conflict 
prevention and solution mechanism, as one facilitating instrument 
to this end appears urgently required.9 Hundreds of thousands of
The limited effectiveness of ECOMOG in Liberia should not be taken to 
mean that such initiatives are bound to fail. Rather, African 
countries should learn from the experience e.g. the necessity to 
ensure sincere and active support from all concerned (which, sadly, 
is not the case in the intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia) . Another 
important lesson is the need to get OAU, the top regional political 
organisation, involved - thus isolating those warring elements not
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lives have been lost in Africa through civil wars (and occasional 
border conflicts). It would be naively unrealistic to hope that 
in future such conflicts and social upheavals could not occur. 
Africa must prepare itself, like the developed countries have 
done through their peace and security framework, for such 
eventualities. It is, lamentably, the case that it has not done 
so to date. It is pathetic that African countries have been 
unable to do anything practical to deal with the situation in 
Somalia. Even now African countries are playing no direct role 
in strategic direction of the UN peace-keeping force in that 
country or in the debate on how to facilitate Somali led 
economic, social and political rehabilitation. The desirability 
of getting Africa oriented to and with capacity to solving its 
own problems of this kind should be apparent.-'-®
iv A broader perspective on the areas for fruitful sub-regional 
action than either the purely economic or the purely political 
approaches usually produce. The 1992 Southern African
amelioration of drought impact effort coordinated by SADC's Food 
Security unit (uniquely for regional economic groupings anywhere 
in the world one of its earliest and strongest units) is an 
example both as to placing the issue on the international agenda 
and in coordinating national responses (especially in respect to 
transport allocation among national and transit food haulage). 
That effort was political - over 3 million lives were at severe 
risk - social - had assistance to stricken households been 2 
months later or 20% lower lives lost would have exceeded
interested in peaceful negotiations while also avoiding the risk of 
one country appearing to dominate (e.g. Nigeria in the case of 
ECOMOG) . Preventing situations such as the one in Rwanda in which 
several thousand newly "demobilised" former Uganda soldiers have 
invaded "their" country (Rwanda) with the full knowledge, and perhaps 
encouragement, of their host country (Uganda) is another example of 
where the OAU should have taken a lead in peace management not merely 
come in at the last moment to bless a basically Tanzania/Burundi 
facilitated process. African countries should also recognise that 
foreign countries and international organisations will not always 
face up to such tragedies on time (as e.g. in the cases of 
Mozambique, Angola after the election and Somalia) or at all (e.g. in 
the case of Rwanda and Liberia until after African led agreements had 
been reached). In the area of intra-African peace-making and 
conflict prevention, as in the field of fighting poverty, Africa is 
very much on its own.
Proposals not dissimilar to these have been made by OAU Secretary 
General Salim Salim but member state response clearly has not 
provided a diplomatic, financial or military foundation for any 
serious exploratory initiatives let alone full scale action.
39
1,500,000 (not perhaps 100,000) - and economic - without relief
flows the years needed for recovery been 5 to 10 not 2 to 3 . 
However, it had little in common with common market crafting or 
traditional conflict ameliorating diplomacy and required an 
integral two way relationship between professional information 
collection and analysis and political decision taking and 
diplomatic initiatives.
v Determined fight for Africa's case and causes in the world - the
way, for example, SADC did for its member countries in respect to 
the South African total onslaught during its first decade. There 
is no doubt that Africa now has to fight for its place in the 
world to ensure that African issues are recognised and that 
Africa gets it share of the international resources available 
through e.g. the World Bank/IMF and specialised UN agencies. The 
principal institutions for providing coherent strategic and 
tactical research to support this struggle are OAU, ECA, the 
African Development Bank and the various sub-regional 
economic/political organisations e.g. SADC, ECOWAS, ECCA (Central 
Africa) and PTA. These institutions will need considerable 
strengthening if they are to undertake this role effectively. 
Today, for example, OAU has minimum technical competence, on the 
economic (and arguably the diplomatic tactical) side, for the 
task. There is also the important aspect of "style". In that 
regard ECA's style during the 1980s appeared (i) to put-off 
potential friends both within and outside of Africa; (ii) to 
concentrate on speaking to foreigners instead of Africans even 
when its criticisms and the power to act on them were African 
focussed; and (iii) to avoid making specific, negotiable 
proposals, including policies and projects, rather than remaining 
largely at the level of generalities. Of the three regional 
institutions ADB has had the most success. It has been worthy, 
substantive, down to earth, responsible, but rarely exciting 
intellectually or innovative operationally - in a sense the 
mirror image of ECA. However, ADB could have contributed more 
had it not been so keen to follow and be influenced by the World 
Bank. In general the conclusion on this point is that African 
countries need to give urgent attention to these regional 
institutions - their roles, their policies and programmes, their
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styles and their interactions between themselves and with sub­
regional organisations and the individual countries themselves.
THE ECONOMIC AGENDA AT THE NATIONAL (COUNTRY) LEVEL
20 Most of the countries under discussion are now in the process of 
implementing "Structural Adjustment Programmes" (SAPs) usually agreed 
with the World Bank and IMF,11 and with financial support from 
bilateral donors including increasingly Japan - the one bilateral 
recently increasing transfers to Africa rapidly and planning to 
continue to do so. In recent years development literature on Africa 
has contained a lively debate on these SAPs and political discourse an 
even livelier one. While it is not intended to go over that debate in 
detail in this monograph, it should be mentioned that there now appears 
to be general acknowledgement of the fact that these programmes, 
although their basic elements are often necessary, do not provide 
sufficient conditions for Africa's economic recovery and growth. 
Moreover, by and large these programmes, which are the 1980s successors 
to the IMF-led “stabilisation'1 programmes of the 1970s (which clearly 
were rarely successful even in their own short term objectives and did 
not, in any case, prevent the spreading and deepening of Africa's 
economic and social crises) have contained many weaknesses including:
i Unrealistic expectations about the scope and depth of their 
beneficial impact and the time needed to achieve that impact.
ii Nearly total concentration on internal aspects to almost virtual
exclusion of external factors such as terms of trade, commodity 
prices, protectionism abroad, debt burden etc., which equally 
important in determining the level of development performance in 
Africa. While recognising that the two Bretton Woods
institutions do not have the leverage to, say, change terms of 
trade, they could, at least, give much more prominence to some of 
these issues and problems. As it is, SAPs have given almost all 
attention to internal or domestic policy failures and related 
weaknesses and more general Bank documents on Africa only 
slightly more attention to the global context. The Bank for
SAP is not a copyrighted trademark. There is no reason a SAP must be 
endorsed by outsiders, albeit of the nationally crafted/unendorsed 
ones only that of Zimbabwe over 1984/1990 had much success.
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example has come to a position fully supportive of substantial 
debt writedowns but has given it such a low profile as to suggest 
it either views it as unattainable or as of little urgency, views 
which few Africa political leaders or analysts would share. One 
result of this - probably unintended as far as the Fund and, 
especially, the World Bank are concerned - has been that in 
consultative group and similar meetings almost all concentration 
has been given to domestic weaknesses and little said about the 
contribution which the donor countries could make in non-aid 
areas - e.g. debt, trade - to facilitate development in Africa. 
Removal of domestic African weaknesses is now almost always a 
condition for additional foreign aid including partial debt 
relief, but there is no similar pressure on donors to examine, 
let alone correct, their policy errors.
iii Too much emphasis on "getting prices right" and inadequate 
attention to "supply side" aspects even though the latter is of 
crucial importance because the objective of SAPs should be to 
achieve economic recovery through increased production of goods 
and services (especially the tradables) and not merely 
achievement of macro-economic balances.^ ^ related point is 
that, ironically, the structural rigidities in African economies 
have not been fully recognised in these "structural adjustment" 
programmes.
iv Most SAPs have tended to ignore the negative impact of the social 
costs associated with the programmes and even more the costs of 
high and rising absolute poverty even if not programme related. 
However, the World Bank now recognises these aspects; the real 
problem appears to be how to build policies and programmes in the 
SAPs for dealing with the social dimension. In that regard it 
should be stressed that tagging on to SAPs one or two programmes 
to cover the social dimension is either cosmetic or a travesty of
The World Bank might consider this criticism unjustified; but it is 
not. For example, how can the Bank expect economic recovery and 
growth to be achieved in Africa without substantial investment in 
infrastructural facilities? If it cannot, why is the failure of most 
SAPs to achieve infrastructural investment revival not highlighted as 
a crucial weakness especially as many of them now approach a decade 
of existence?
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efficient coordinated resource allocation to further priority 
objectives.
v The tendency to underestimate the external resources required13 -
which partly explains why limited progress appears to have been 
achieved in spite of very courageous political and economic 
efforts by many African countries. ^  The situation is serious, 
and the validity of SAPs and their appropriateness are now being 
questioned in Africa and by those outsiders who study the 
situation and see little evidence of improvement or hope after a 
decade or more of SAPs.
vi transforming their export bases is vital for most African 
economies. How is a contextual issue: new primary products
(e.g. horticulture, fruit juice), processed forms of present 
exports (e.g. cocoa intermediates, lumber-plywood-veneer), 
manufactures based on primary products, (e.g. furniture kits, 
shoes-belts-bags) and niche products (e.g. West African prints - 
East African khanga and kitenge and garments made from them) all 
have substantial potential globally in parallel to more intra- 
African trade in manufactures, industrial inputs, food and 
electricity. Rarely will the appropriate answer be one or two 
products, but equally rarely will "getting prices" (exchange 
rates/tax regimes/wages) “right" lead automatically to broad 
front breakthroughs. Research into potential winners and 
targeted subsidies toward market development costs are among
The fact that SAPs directly involve bilateral donors may lead the 
World Bank to work on figures which it considers the donors would be 
willing to accept. A better approach would be to present a fully 
objective picture on requirements, even if aid resources were likely 
to be well below those requirements.
The Bank's reviews suggest substantially similar domestic efforts in 
Africa and elsewhere but disproportionately lower results. As the 
one unchanged message in Bank overall reviews of SSA from 1981 
through 1989 has been the need for more transfers and since at a 
subcontinental level this has not been achieved, the cause of the 
high effort /low payoff paradox may not be hard to find. Indeed the 
1981 Berg Report (Agenda for Action) saw only 2 to 2.5% GDP growth 
rates as possible if aid did not rise substantially even were 
proposed reforms implemented. As it projected moderately improved - 
not massively worsened - terms of and growth in world trade for 
Africa in the 1980's, that translates to at best 1 to 1.5% in the 
actual context. At 2% SSA has, in fact, performed better than thp 
Bank model suggested it could given the lack of massive resource 
transfer boosts and the presence of unforeseen term of trade 
deterioration!
43
appropriate public sector roles to encourage and complement 
private or just venture production.
vii restoring fixed investment levels to at least 20% at gross and 
10% at current price levels (not historic cost as normally and 
inaccurately used in national accounts depreciation estimates, a 
shift raising the gross/net divergence from about 3% to about 10% 
of GDP) is essential to long term (and usually to medium term) 
growth and, even more, to structural transformation. SAPs 
demonstrably do not have a strong positive impact e.g. Ghana has 
- after ten years - only recovered to 15% gross and 5% net. 
Granted SAPs do not lower rates of investment - Tanzania is at or 
near the 20%-10% level but it never fell much below that level in 
the 1979-83 depression or the 1984-86 pre-SAP domestic
stabilisation effort. To date SAPs do tend to raise (or sustain)
public sector investment with little evidence of "crowding out* 
private but are not “pulling in" adequate levels of private
sector directly productive investment.
viii Another important point is that on the whole these programmes 
have not paid adequate attention to what must be done to increase 
the levels of domestic and foreign private investment - an 
essential requirement foz economic recovery. In that connection 
it is clear that in addition to getting "prices right" and
removing unnecessary controls and regulations, the achievement of 
the required levels of private investment demand the 
rehabilitation and expansion of infrastructural facilities and of 
governance. Rehabilitation and further development of
infrastructural facilities should not be excluded from SAPs or 
under-emphasised in them because of their longer than medium term 
time dimension and high external transfer requirements.
ix One major source of weakness of SAPs, which the World Bank has 
now recognised, has been their initially being seen or treated as 
rather short or medium term programmes which was the intent in 
1981 but gradually shifted to a 10 to 15 year perspective by 
1990. The financial and political costs involved in a long term 
approach (e.g. in the infrastructural sector) may be a factor in 
the failure to adjust SAP orientation as their time frame
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lengthened. See, for example, the rather strange policy 
statement in the Bank's LTPS study that provision of 
infrastructure should await demand.
x Focus specifically on a strategy to shift from corrective
structural adjustment to restored development sustaining
transformation. Simply extending structural adjustment
indefinitely is not an adequate answer as, at least implicitly, 
the World Bank recognises in LTPS which is at least half about 
transformation. But to date the issues of sequences, transitions 
and long haul requirements diverging from those either of 
stabilisation or initial structural adjustment have not been 
analyzed systematically which for - e.g. - Ghana, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania and, less clearly given recent setbacks, Kenya is now 
urgent because most of the strictly short to medium term 
structural adjustment measures will have been taken by 1995 and 
it is unlikely that after that point "more of the same” will be a 
prudent or even a sustainable answer to "what now?”
21 However, in spite of these limitations most SAPs contain important 
elements which form part of the list of the necessary conditions for 
dealing with Africa's economic crisis. These elements including the 
following:
i Proper management of government finances, especially controlling 
the level of budget deficit.
ii Pursuit of appropriate monetary policies - especially with regard 
to the rate of interest, exchange rate, and the volume and growth 
of bank credit.
iii Greater reliance on and use of market mechanism - and therefore 
removal of unnecessary price controls, subsidies and various 
direct measures for controlling supply of goods and services.
iv Appropriate tariffs to reduce over-protection and to encourage 
export orientation.
v Greater reliance on the private sector - and therefore provision 
of the necessary incentives as well as privatisation of eligible 
public enterprises, especially those directly engaged in
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production of goods and commercial services (e.g. textiles, road 
transport, hotels); etc.
vi "Good governance". especially ensuring transparency,
accountability, and an efficient public service.
22 It is essential that African countries should continue with their 
efforts in these policy areas whether SAPs continue or not. To blame 
SAPs and the Bank either for the costs of pre-SAP economic malaise of 
those of non-implemented SAPs may be politically appealing in the short 
run. However it lacks credibility and misdirects attention away from 
very real problems which must be addressed seriously. But following 
the standard SAP check-list will not be enough: direct attention must 
be given to a number of specific programmes areas. These include 
rehabilitation and expansion of infrastructural facilities; food 
production; employment creation; population planning; economic 
cooperation; and poverty reduction. These six areas are, in fact, 
closely related, and a few words on each are in order. With regard to 
infrastructural facilities some comments have already been made to 
underline the importance and urgency of rebuilding and expanding them. 
Without that very little will be achieved in stimulating private 
investment (both domestic and external), greater agricultural 
production, expansion of exports, or reduction of rural poverty, etc. 
More will be said on that subject when discussing the Regional economic 
Agenda.
23 In the area of food production it is abundantly clear that the 
situation is increasingly desperate in many countries. While adverse 
weather conditions, especially the widespread and prolonged drought of 
the early 1980s and that of the last three years have contributed to 
the prevailing situation, there is no doubt that inappropriate policy 
measures. by no means limited to or even necessarily primarily in 
respect to prices, and - probably even more - the absence of adequate 
programmes to enable small family farmers to produce and to sell more 
have been primarily responsible for the continued decline in food 
production per capita in Africa. For example in spite of its critical 
importance, especially in feeding the people, providing employment, 
earning foreign exchange, etc., food crop agriculture has received much 
less in the way of fiscal incentives than manufacturing in most African
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countries. Further rather misguided efforts to keep urban food prices 
low have kept formal producer prices in many countries down with varied 
negative impacts on production, marketing efficiency, import bills and 
transparency but no evident gains on actual general urban food prices 
except when massive subsidised import supplies could be put on the 
market. In addition agriculture has been, in many cases, severely 
taxed. Agricultural research - especially for food crops - has 
sometimes not received adequate resources and rarely has been 
formulated in a coherent strategic frame. This list of inappropriate 
policies and measures could be extended. Consequently much of Africa 
is now increasingly unable to feed itself, and an increasing proportion 
of Africa's people are either directly starving in crisis years or 
doing so gradually every year in the sense that food intake per day is 
simply not adequate to sustain a healthy and productive life. This 
nutrition can is the basic cause of Africa's appalling under 5 
mortality gap (75 to 100 more under 5 deaths per 1, 000 live births) 
when compared to other poor and lower middle income countries.
24 Lack of adequate food has many negative implications in addition to
poor health and malnutrition. For example, it tends to lead to
lawlessness (whether corruption, illegal marketeering or armed robbery) 
in those countries which do not have enough foreign exchange to import 
food. More generally it leads to great dependence on food aid - with 
all its economic and political consequences. It also leads to high 
effective food prices for urban consumers which then have a direct 
impact on wage rates and therefore the competitiveness of domestic 
products. Because the inefficiencies associated both with most 
marketing boards and with oligopsonised parallel markets mean little of 
the extra price cost to consumers gets back to farmers, the latter are 
forced to cut trees (not buy kerosine) and to slaughter till land for 
want of resources to fertilise and protect it. The environmental costs 
are evident - including to the farmers who can however do little to 
lower them until the poverty/survival vise crushing them is loosened 
e.g. low incomes prevent substitution of kerosine for wood for cooking;
low productivity per hour in agriculture and the need to earn off farm
cash incomes prevents farm households from undertaking tree planting 
and tending or erosion control works such as terracing of gully filling 
(unless these are state financed employing the farming community's 
members part time to undertake them). Sustained efforts to reverse the
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trend so that African countries can produce more of their food 
requirements as rapidly as possible are a necessity - for political 
stability as well as for economic reasons. In that regard Africa, and 
many African countries, have the natural resource base to produce 
massive additional quantities of food - for internal consumption and 
for export. But that demands, in addition to better policies, focused 
agricultural research, application of more technology (including much 
greater use of fertilisers) , in some countries appropriate land 
tenure and ownership systems and patterns (which would recognise the 
great potential of smallholder agriculture in all ways, including 
productivity and income distribution) , trade cooperation between 
African countries in agricultural products, etc. It is also clear that 
elimination or reduction of protectionism in industrial countries would 
help substantially - for example in the horticultural and livestock and 
ocean products sectors.
25 Gender aspects of development require serious attention in the context 
of main policy, programme and project identification, formulation and 
implementation. Because divisions of labour, of income sources and of 
budgetary responsibilities do exist (as well as up to 25% female headed 
households in rural areas and the towns of war ravaged countries)
blindness to gender issues is directly economically inefficient as well 
as socially damaging and - in respect to effective access to
participation in production as well as of governance) a major barrier
to democratisation. For example, because women and girls do collect 
water and are responsible for maintenance then women's involvement in 
rural and peri urban water project design and in water user management 
and maintenance committees is crucial to policy and project initial
success and sustainability. Further because it can save up to 5 hours 
a day for women and girls in rural areas, provision of accessible, pure 
water may be the most effective way to empower women to produce more 
food and to enable more rural girls to attend school. Put in this way 
the case for gender consciousness looks like fairly evident common
Use of fertilisers in Africa is much less than in other developing 
regions e.g. according to two experts "only 9 kilograms of plant 
nutrients were applied per hectare of arable land (in Africa) in 
1989/90, 5 per cent of the amount applied in East Asia and the
Pacific". See Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Rajul Pandya-Loreh, External 
Assistance in Support of Sustainable Alleviation of Poverty, Food 
Security, and Malnutrition in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s, 
paper prepared for DANIDA/CUF Symposium on Strategies for Development 
Cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa, Copenhagen, January 1993.
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sense. But in practice it is only recently the gender implications of 
water have been recognised and a majority of Ministers and Ministries
of Water still do not take them into account. The issue is not
necessarily separate programmes nor production units for women -
although these may in some cases be relevant within, e.g. agriculture 
just as separate approaches to meet the divergent needs of tree, bush, 
field and animal crop oriented farmers are normally perceived to be 
necessary. The quickest wav to facilitate women's and girls' access
(e.g. to rural credit and to primary education) may be to ensure
universal access. Similarly how to advance from a household land 
tenure perception that heads of household are male and that in complete 
households all tenure should be vested in the senior adult male can be 
answered in various ways; recognising that female heads of household 
are now common and should not be discriminated against; reorienting 
inheritance toward surviving spouse (male or female) and children; 
putting household tenure rights in the joint names of wife (or wives) 
and man not man only, etc. The point is to accept that gender aspects 
are pervasive, serious and require priority attention. This is an area 
in which Northern feminist approaches to gender are often quite 
irrelevant to African women's priorities (because they come from very 
different contextual backgrounds) and stylistically prone to generating 
animosity (not only among men). More involvement of African women and 
women's groups in studying and proposing practical measures relevant to 
gender issues is needed both because that is a logical element in 
gender consciousness and because this is a field in which unadapted 
import model approaches appear peculiarly inappropriate.
26 High priority also needs to be given to creating more non-aaricultural 
jobs and other livelihood opportunities. As of now unemployment, in 
its various forms especially partially disguised unemployment, 
underemployment and "full", but devastatingly low productivity, 
employment is a major and growing problem in many African countries. 
The problem, as noted above, is particularly acute among youth whose 
declared open unemployment rates are 50% or more in many countries' 
urban areas. High levels of unemployment represent a massive waste of 
resources and an unexploited economic potential. Equally, they are to 
a large extent responsible for the increasing lawlessness and violence 
in many African countries, especially - but not only - in urban areas. 
Substantial and direct attention should and can be given to this
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problem. The kinds of actions required to promote economically 
appropriate agricultural and industrial development at macro economic 
level are consistent with the employment creation objective. But much 
more articulation is needed to act on that potentially positive fact. 
Actions including public works programmes to alleviate the 
employment/purchasing power situation as well as to restore 
infrastructure are relevant in the short-run and, among long-term 
related approaches population planning is a major example.
27 It is heartening that population planning is now discussed openly, with 
many countries carrying out, although not always vigorously, family 
planning programmes. The reality is that population growth in Africa 
is much too high relative to present and realistic future production 
and production growth levels. In that connection fertility rates 
average 6.4, and the rate of population increase itself about 3.1% per 
year. These rates are serious obstacles if African countries are going 
to produce enough food for themselves; create enough jobs for their 
labour forces; achieve higher savings rates to enable them to invest in 
the required areas, including education and health; conserve their 
natural environment (especially soil and vegetative cover); etc. 
Happily, effective and not very costly techniques for family planning 
now exist. This is an area in which African countries cannot blame 
external forces, natural disasters or foreign advice for lack of 
performance even if one may query the sensitivity and adequacy of some 
external approaches. In that regard African countries should aim at
reducing the rate of increase of population to about 2% within 10 years 
or earlier.^ The experiences of some countries of Far East and South 
East Asia, for example, show that kind of target is realisable given 
complete determination and commitment. African countries must
recognise family planning as one of the most effective areas of 
investment in their development efforts. Performance here will be a 
major factor in determining the overall result.
28 Some analysts (and readers) might think that the population factor is 
being given too much weight in this analysis. But this is not the 
case. Clearly family planning bv itself would achieve little. It must
A 2% rate of population growth would still be high, especially if 
higher rates of economic growth, including industrialisation, are not 
achieved. However, as a target for the African countries in ten 
years it is the most reasonable.
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therefore be accompanied by other development efforts. These include 
elimination of illiteracy, education of women and their involvement in
modern sector activities, programmes to reduce infant mortality.
elimination of acute poverty, where practicable old age pensions.
Recent development experiences of some countries, especially the newly 
industrialising countries, show the powerful contribution of rapidly 
falling fertility rates in achieving development objectives when linked 
with the parallel demand enhancement measures cited.
Another argument might be that the most effective population growth 
reduction device is rapid economic growth. We know from the economic 
history of the now developed countries, that higher rates of economic 
growth, and the resultant decline in death rates lead to lower 
fertility rates. But the special situation now facing African 
countries, including historically unprecedented population growth rates 
resulting in the doubling of population within very short periods, 
demands that the leisurely argument of expecting economic growth to "do 
the job" must not be relied on. Targeted measures to enable poor 
households (and especially poor rural households) to produce more do
have substantially greater relevance - if rural access £2 family
planning knowledge and technology is expanded.
Therefore, while accepting that family planning technology by itself is 
not sufficient, it is repeated and stressed that population planning, 
using available technologies and devices, should be one of the top 
priority items in planning for African countries' economic and social 
development. One aspect understressed to date is education for men. 
There is evidence that men on average desire larger families and 
enforce their preferences on women, especially in rural areas. Just as 
family planning should be one element in universal access primary 
health care so should it be a standard element in health education.
The case is not for family planning as a substitute for growth or 
poverty reduction but as one key element in overall growth and poverty 
reduction achievement. It is no accident that the high growth, low 
infant mortality, high female literacy, substantial safety net for poor 
household countries - e.g. Botswana and Mauritius - also have high 
contraceptive use and fertility decline rates.
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29 Another area which requires direct and carefully articulated attention 
will be discussed more fully in the next section: regional and
subregional economic cooperation. Coordinated development is
particularly important for achievement of higher rates of 
industrialisation and higher capacity utilisation rates in present and 
future plants. It is increasingly clear that African countries must 
industrialise - including for export - if they are to overcome the 
economic weakness and vulnerability which now characterise most of 
them. Almost complete dependence on a few un or minimally processed 
export commodities for foreign exchange earnings, government revenues 
and modern sector employment is a major and debilitating weakness in 
these economies. Greater production of these commodities will never 
bring about the levels of economic and social development required even 
when it will allow moderate real export earning gains let alone in 
cases - such as cocoa for the Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana - in which even 
at the country level more physical export volume means less export 
earnings because price elasticities are below market shares. Such 
cases are even more common for groups of countries or continentally. 
If Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique were to double cashew output in a 
brief period, or the main African coffee producers were to do the same, 
the resultant price falls would result in each earning less, not more, 
foreign exchange - a point now accepted by the World Bank. Another 
route towards development and especially earned import capacity growth 
is therefore needed. As seen in economic history, and more recently in 
the newly industrialising countries, the kind of economic structural 
transformation required can only be achieved through industrialisation 
not only of production but also of export patterns, sometimes - but not 
always - through processing or manufacturing present raw material 
exports. For example cocoa intermediates (butter, paste, powder, mass) 
would yield higher unit value per tonne of beans, would not depress 
cocoa prices as would higher bean production, would be marketable. 
Similarly, for any volume of logs cut, a mix of lumber, veneer, plywood 
and furniture kit parts can yield up to ten times the export proceeds 
and at least double the employment of the raw logs.
3 0 This statement is not, of course, new in the African context although 
its stress on manufactured exports is less standard. Most "development 
plans" of African countries include strong statements about encouraging 
manufacturing. Some countries have experimented with various types of
52
"incentives" to promote industrialisation. But after 30 or so years of 
"development planning" very little progress has been achieved in this 
area. Clearly a new approach is needed - and one major component in 
that approach is economic cooperation based on production sharing. In 
Africa most of the economies are so small that economic cooperation 
with the neighbouring countries is both necessary and urgent. For 
these countries the advice now being given to be export oriented only 
makes sense if it is seen within frameworks of cooperation with 
neighbouring countries with the aim of diversifying these countries' 
economies and facilitating global manufactured export breakthroughs.
More generally it is necessary to see import substitution and export 
expansion as sides of the same coin rather than as alternatives. Even 
in the same industry this is frequently true e.g. textiles and 
garments, wood and leather products. Certainly parallel domestic and 
export oriented production is more broadly feasible in the short term 
sub-regionally but it has regional and global relevance as well e.g. 
for natural gas based fertilisers, for selected steel products for wood 
products from lumber through plywood to furniture.
31 Finally African countries should give high priority to addressing the 
issue of growing and deepening mass poverty. In particular they must 
not mislead themselves by thinking that the problem will, somehow, be 
solved automatically as "development proceeds" - if indeed they are 
able to achieve economic recovery and growth without enhancing 
production by and thereby effective demand of poor households which is 
possible for some but most unlikely for many. They need to realise 
that some economic development paths - in terms of GDP and even in 
terms of higher growth rates in manufacturing - have been followed 
relatively successfully elsewhere and, indeed, in Africa in the 1960's 
while widespread acute poverty persisted or expanded. In Africa today, 
with deepening mass poverty, there is after all a small minority of 
wealthy people whose living standards and circumstances clearly exceed 
those of most development country households.
32 Looking at the whole situation, it is clear that immediate reduction 
and future elimination of poverty requires to be built into all 
development programmes and policies not handled by a collection of 
small peripheral, add on projects about as effective as sticking
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plasters on cut arteries. Within that commitment absolute poverty 
should have top priority. Strategic components include primary school 
and adult education, primary health care and food security for all. 
This is not "welfare" - illiterate, sick, malnourished people cannot 
work long, hard and productively. It also entails ensuring that the 
people are enabled to be directly involved in the production process 
(hence the importance of small family farm or smallholder agriculture, 
small-scale and informal sector industries, etc.); strenuous efforts to 
deal with unemployment; etc.
In this context it is important to recognise that most African 
households have multiple incomes i.e. several household members earn, 
sectoral income sources are multiple and, not infrequently, one 
household member has multiple incomes from quite different activities. 
To enable households to climb out of absolute poverty is not a matter 
of concentrating on raising one type of income - e.g. formal sector 
minimum wage. And again there is a gender aspect because women's 
income opportunities tend to be clustered (even though they diverge 
from country to country and particularly between West and East Africa). 
Therefore both the incomes of women in complete households (which are 
particularly relevant to those items of household budgets perceived as 
female obligations - notably food and non-school fee expenditure on 
children) and of female headed households will be affected very 
differently by different selections of earning opportunities to promote 
and by the presence or absence of affirmative action for women (e.g. by 
35% quotas in Botswana) in respect to labour intensive public works 
employment.
The multiple income (and different male/female patterns of sources) 
point applies to rural as well as urban households. In most parts of 
Africa non-poor small farm households above the poverty line are able 
to remain there because of income other than from household consumption 
of own output plus sale of crops or livestock: e.g. seasonal or casual
work for other farmers, seasonal plantation employment by one family 
member, local non-farm employment (particularly construction), sales of 
non-farm (or processed farm) products and services (e.g. beer brewing 
and beergarden keeping). In the 1960's and 1970's these sources 
accounted for about 25% of overall family small farms household cash
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income in Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania. This has clear implications for 
organising rural infrastructure renewal and conservation/rehabilitation 
programmes around labour intensive, seasonal projects employing workers 
from the area’s farming households and - following the Botswana 
precedent - to ensuring substantial effective female access to these 
income streams.
Poverty reduction strategy has three components:
i enabling poor people to product and earn.
ii Ensuring universal access to basic social services/investment 
(primary health care, primary and adult education, pure water, 
agricultural and other production related extension services, 
nutrition) which both add to household incomes/levels of well 
being directly and enable them to be more productive.
iii providing survival safety nets for victims of calamities e.g. 
drought, flood) and catastrophes (e.g. war) until they have been 
enabled to restore their livelihoods as well as for unempowerable 
households - basically those with too high a ratio of mouths to 
feed to able bodied hands to earn (e.g. many female headed 
households and most disable person or aged person headed 
households with several dependents).
On the production and social services/investment fronts the key to 
success is not to devise projects exclusively for poor (or absolutely 
poor) people but to ensure that poor people do have/are enabled to have 
access to main line programmes. This has clear implications for e.g. 
fee patterns and waivers for all basic services even if ways of acting 
on them is often hard to devise and execute.
55
Nor are poor people necessarily the only groups requiring enablement 
within a poverty reduction focussed programme. If low rural cash 
incomes are linked to poor market access flowing from inadequate rural 
trader capital and vehicles then public sector action to facilitate 
empowering rural traders to buy vehicles and to have funds to buy farm 
produce is likely to be crucial to reducing rural poverty. The traders 
are not poor and - therefore - are not logical recipients of grants or 
subsidised loans but may need steps to provide them with effective 
access to term credit for vehicles and revolving commercial credit 
(overdraft) for working capital.
The democratisation process is relevant. One would expect popularly, 
competitively elected political leaders to have a direct and vested 
interest in dealing with a problem afflicting most of their 
constituents. Ways and methods of ensuring that poverty remains a 
maior and high profile issue in the national political agenda must be 
an important element in poverty reduction programmes. However, 
political priority needs to be backed bv competently articulated 
policies to yield results. Tanzania's crop credit disasters were the 
direct result of political priority (peasants frequently changed their 
MPs) but hardly yielded value for money to the intended beneficiaries 
let alone the tax-payers, and therefore ultimately failed to serve 
their political promoters well either. Without both political priority 
backed by resources and technically viable strategic components to 
reduce poverty, competitive politics may well lead to political 
instability as poor majorities regularly turn out representatives who 
have failed them and to economic chaos as highly different flawed 
policies succeed one another in rapid succession.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA
33 A major imperative in the regional economic Agenda for the 1990s should 
be determined and imaginative pursuit of effective economic cooperation 
between African countries. In that regard several realities need to be 
recognised:
i Enormous disadvantages flow from the very small size of most and
relatively small scale of all African economies (not excluding 
South Africa, Egypt or Algeria) - especially because a majority 
of households are poor or very poor, giving still lower effective
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demand levels for most products. These constraints are very 
evident barriers to promoting industrialisation (including that 
of the agricultural sector) . This is particularly so when the 
industrialisation process must to a large extent start with 
import substitution which means the larger the domestic market 
base the better. To achieve an adequate base usually will mean 
cooperation with neighbouring countries, based on planned 
production sharing.
ii Economic cooperation, while desirable and necessary for economic 
recovery and growth, is a challenging exercise, not least 
politically. Past failures attest to that fact. Economic 
cooperation demands political "wisdom" and courage, priority 
attention in policy selection and resource allocation and also 
technically informed innovation in designing the framework for 
cooperation. Imported common market models do not work either 
politically or economically and their continued promotion by ECA, 
e.g. in the Abuja Treaty, as the centre piece of an African 
economic integration dynamic is grounds for concern. Tariff 
reduction as such has little political sex appeal; attempts by 
all countries to maximize exports to partners while minimizing 
imports from them are economically impossible to achieve, 
illogical economically and divisive politically. Common interests 
commonly perceived and pursuable more cost effectively - or only 
- jointly rather than singly, not abstract "efficient trade 
maximisation" are the logically and potentially practically 
viable base for economic integration economically just as much as 
politically.
African countries need to plan their future cooperation 
arrangements with the past experiences firmly in mind. The 
lessons of the past both as to failures and as to partial 
successes should be used in working out specific initiatives for 
the future. While especially true in respect to economic 
regionalism, this is a more general point. The lack of effective 
historic memory is costing African states and peoples dearly 
because it results in repeating failures and in not remembering 
approaches which have worked. Failure to know, reflect on and 
learn from history dooms one to repeat its failures at concrete
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as much as at philosophical levels - and to fail to repeat past 
successes. One major lesson from the past is that future 
cooperation arrangements should contain deliberate efforts to
ensure creation of "vested interests" in each participating
country in the economic cooperation framework and process. That 
demands, amongst other things, inclusion of more sectors than 
manufacturing in the cooperation framework and avoiding an 
overbearing central secretariat which may unify member states but 
only in seeing the regional body as an outside "them" versus "us" 
which is the first step toward its marginalisation or/and 
disintegration. In particular development of modern agricultural 
activities, which past cooperation arrangements have either 
ignored or because of the emphasis on industrialisation, or 
excluded to protect vested interests frequently should figure 
prominently in both production and arrangements. As already 
observed, in Africa economic integration must have production - 
including production of knowledge - sharing as one of the basic 
elements. Politically production and livelihoods are the key 
payoffs of any policy. Inclusion of agriculture, as well as of 
transportation and of energy, makes such a strategy easier to 
formulate and to implement. It is also worth adding that 
production sharing is not as difficult to formulate and operate - 
politically or technically - as some analysts have argued.
How to share production depends on contexts not least what 
production. For research an agreed core institution linking and 
serving a network of national units - as in SADC1s drought 
resistant cereals and SACCAR (Southern African Centre for 
Coordination of Agricultural Research) - can be negotiated among 
governments. In ports, harbours, railways and hydroelectricity 
negotiated contracts or projects among nationally based - usually 
public sector - enterprises pose few problems in principle. In 
respect to manufacturing greater complexities arise - fixed 
allocation by governments does not usually work well albeit the 
old East African Community textile capacity licensing scheme (in 
many ways analogous to EEC's steel sector management of capacity) 
had a reasonably good record. But public sector studies on 
existing and planned capacity in the region (as done by SADC for 
several industries) and of comparative costs of different
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locations (done by the old EAC with rather non-intuitive results 
suggesting scale advantages swamped any other differences among 
Dar es Salaam, Mombasa, Arusha - Moshi and Nairobi - but not for 
Kampala - Entebbe - Jinja - for most industries) can create a 
climate influencing investor decisions (not least averting 
creation of excess capacity) if secure regional access is 
assured. Further a gentlemen's agreement not to bid with tax 
concessions for investors in a way creating both imbalance and 
loss of revenue to all countries can usually be achieved as well 
as - at least in some cases - agreement to allow one or two 
states but not others to offer infrastructural and related 
incentives to pre-agreed industries in the interests of balance. 
The bottom line is that for most investors viable infrastructure 
and guaranteed market access are far more important than 
particular tax concessions and that a system ensuring the former 
will be worked with at least among sites whose underlying cost 
difference are minor.
iii The rest of the world, especially the developed countries, will 
not always be supportive to regional integration efforts in 
Africa - partly because of commercial and political interests, 
especially those of ex-colonial powers. African countries need 
to be sensitive to the risk of foreign engineered obstacles in 
their way as they promote integration between themselves. Such 
obstacles could include use of external aid and commercial ties 
with the developed countries providing them. This is not 
inevitable. Some aspects of integration - notably
communications, transport, standardisation and simplification of 
procedures, energy - tend to be useful to external trading 
partners as well and larger markets serve foreign owned as well 
as domestic enterprise interests. To the extent economic 
integration enhances growth it is likely to shift and increase, 
not reduce, the level of extrareaional imports. A more general 
danger may be that the past record of integration may make 
resource transferring states (and enterprise investors) write it 
off as a non-starter with unfortunate results as to funding 
potential. In dealing with external obstacles African countries 
must recognise that their collective action, and promotion of 
self-reliance on a collective basis, are absolutely necessary not
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only for their economic growth but, indeed, their very survival 
as viable and independent nations.
34 The second item on the Regional Economic Agenda, directly related to 
economic integration, is coordinated development of basic 
infrastructural facilities. The situation in this sector in Africa as 
a whole is appalling - characterised mainly by deterioration and 
disintegration of established facilities in most countries. This 
compounds the prior problem of inappropriately designed facilities - 
whose aim was to serve the former metropolitan powers and external 
trade more generally and resulting in many cases especially in West 
Africa in failing to link neighbouring African countries with each 
other. Very low investment since independence in railways; enormous 
increases in development and maintenance costs of infrastructure partly 
because of corruption and collusion with contractors (both national and 
foreign) and partly because of excessive use of tied aid and failure to 
build up even medium scale, cost efficient domestic contractors (public 
or private, foreign or domestically owned), etc. compound the sector's 
weakness. No economic recovery and growth will take place in the 
continent unless this sector receives adequate attention. In that 
regard the suggestion that infrastructural development should await 
"demand" (as suggested in the World Bank most recent major publication 
on economic strategy for SSA, LTPS) should be completed disregarded, 
except insofar as it is addressed to Pharaonic engineering dreams, like 
the Gaborone to Cairo or the Tripoli to Lagos highway, totally 
unrelated to potential, as well as to present, use. In the situation 
facing African countries today infrastructural facilities should, 
ideally, be "ready for demand" - especially since private investments 
with regional market orientation are so important in achieving economic 
recovery and growth and will not be made unless they perceive existing 
infrastructure as adequate.
35 Major consideration to bear in mind regarding coordinated development 
of infrastructural facilities is that they will not only provide more 
effective links between African countries in the physical sense but 
also reduce the overall costs of meeting demand. A good example beyond 
transport is electricity. Well planned hydro-electric and natural gas 
based power plants linked to regional grid systems could serve 
neighbouring countries much more effectively and efficiently, both as
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to reduction of capital costs, and in most cases also as to recurrent 
generation/purchase costs even for importing states. For each country 
to attempt to meet all its requirements nationally is expensive 
economic nonsense as well as a barrier to overall multisectoral 
expansion of trade.
36 Because the sub-regional economic integration process must be based on 
commonly perceived, common interests if it is to be sustained, laying 
down rigid guidelines for sub-regional programme content is 
counterproductive. For example agricultural (including veterinary) 
research, food security based on early warning analysis of impending 
shortfalls and control of cross border animal disease foci have been a 
programme priority in SADC and one which has paid off both for the 
countries and the regional programme's substantive usefulness and 
support group generation. Similar or different priorities - e.g. sub­
regional tourist promotion programmes to take advantage of economies of 
scale and of broader range of attractions - probably apply to each sub- 
region. Likewise, in the trade field a number of supporting measures: 
simplification and standardisation of documentation, transit traffic 
regimes, vehicle papers and fees rules, regional Chamber of Commerce 
(or Federation of national chambers), support for enterprise mounting 
of regional sales and purchases promotion missions (or agents) as well 
as participation in international trade fairs, coordination of 
standards and certification procedures (including issuance of 
domestic/regional content certificates) are examples. None of the 
items in this cluster of topics is vital to all sub-regions. Few are 
dramatic - albeit SADC1s involvement in ameliorating 1991-2 
drought/1992-3 famine danger exercise was relatively high profile. 
Each is, however, valuable in respect to financial gains, to enhanced 
applied knowledge available, to building up constituencies for 
regionalism among beneficiaries while the trade related cluster as well 
as joint tourism promotion (like the telecommunications and posts 
aspects of transport) are important to creating an enabling climate for 
enterprises to use and co strengthen the economic potential crated by 
sub-regionalism.
37 The sub-regional (and subsequently regional) agenda set out has 
implications for institutional structures:
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i governments should be integrally involved at all stages - not 
given cut and dried proposals from over mighty and over detached 
secretariats.
ii personnel should be concentrated in sectoral professional units 
servicing programmes probably decentralised with particular 
governments providing guidance and support to one or more sectors 
in which they are particularly interested.
iii close cooperation should be built up with national and regional 
economic actors - e.g. chambers of commerce, banker's 
associations, large enterprises, trade unions.
iv regular dialogue with international agencies and bilateral donors 
to ensure they understand regional priorities and do not 
undermine them with competing multicountry initiatives of their 
own.
v attention to operational coordination (e.g. intra regional 
airline timetables, railway management, hydroelectric 
professional training, containerisation schedules) as well as 
bricks and mortar projects.
vi developing a regional economic data and analysis base to create 
an enabling climate for enterprises, to facilitate policy 
coordination beyond the core regional programme (e.g. by 
Ministries of Finance and Central Banks on interest, exchange and 
tax rates).
vii innovative examination of national problems and initiatives with 
a view to determining which ones can be tackled better with 
either regional coordination/programming or by regionally 
facilitated exchange of data, visits, training etc.
viii Prioretisation within and among sectors (and sequencing of 
additions) to ensure that resources are deployed effectively and 
that concrete, visible gains flow to each member state promptly. 
A corollary is prioretising out or deferring initiatives which 
lead to vehement inter state disagreement, duplicate existing 
arrangements (e.g. the Eastern and Southern African Mulpoc which 
now parallels and on occasion conflicts with both SADC and PTA
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over the whole range of its activities), or appear unlikely to 
yield significant results (e.g. the Southern African Development 
Bank indefinitely postponed because soundings of potential 
finance sources suggested little or no additionality could be 
expected).
ix Recognition that the requirement of serving key interests of each 
member state applies at overall programme level, may or may not 
apply sectorally and will rarely apply to particular projects 
(e.g. while SATCC's port corridor approach groups and prioretises 
to serve 9 of its 10 members it cannot be very relevant to South 
Africa surrounded Lesotho and no one corridor or project is
relevant to more than 5) .
38 The third item on the Regional Economic Agenda should be better 
preparation for negotiations with non-African countries and
international organisations (e.g. the Paris Club). The external debt 
problem facing many African countries is a key example. The debt 
burden has continued to grow in the continent in spite of many
resolutions urging the international community to deal with it, and in 
spite of the various half hearted "initiatives" the debt proposed by 
the creditors. The situation is truly deplorable. In 1991, for
example, Africa actually paid-*-7 over US$ 26 billion to the creditors in 
servicing the debt. Debt service ratios on a payments basis are now 
very high - upwards of 30% of exports on average at a time when export 
earnings are being hit by declining commodity prices, shrinking revenue 
from tourism; etc. Africa needs substantial inflows of capital but the 
debt including repayments to the World Bank and IMF18 has become a 
major source of capital outflow. Private inflows have virtually 
disappeared and overall aid programmes are stagnant in real (and 
declining in real per capita) terms while for some countries they are 
rapidly shrinking. Unless there is a satisfactory solution to external 
debt overhang most African countries will not be able to achieve 
substantial economic recovery, let alone sustained growth. The main
17 Up to one half the debt is not being serviced but has not been 
written off so arrears and - theoretically - future debt service are 
rapidly rising despite these crippling levels of payments.
Actually in the case of IMF there continues to be a substantial net 
(reverse) flow of funds to it from Africa. This is, clearly, not an 
acceptable situation even if one accepts that standard fund 
facilities are grossly unsuitable for structural rehabilitation and 
transformation investment.
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creditors have insisted on case-by-case treatment of this problem - a 
strategy which makes the negotiating position of the debtor country 
very weak. That approach also tends to mask the widespread nature of 
the debt problem, and the urgent need to undertake more meaningful 
measures (including substantial reduction of the debt stock or, more 
precisely, the present and future debt service flows required1 )^ within 
a comprehensive framework. In this regard the African countries have 
been right in insisting that an international conference on their 
external debt should be held. That proposal was actually made about 
four years ago, and the African countries subsequently held meetings to 
agree on their “common position" on the debt issue. African countries 
should continue to urge the international community to hold such a 
conference, especially now that the UN Secretary-General has himself 
come out strongly in indicating the strangling nature of the debt 
problem.^ Clearly such a conference could not negotiate individual 
debt rescheduling/write down agreements, but could set up auidelines 
within which all cases could be handled.
The overall approach to debt overhang crises by seeking a common 
analytical framework leading to generally applicable guidelines for 
solutions has, in fact, now been adopted by the World Bank in respect 
to SSA. Basically its model turns on output per capita, ratios of debt 
service to exports and necessary import levels for sustained growth. 
From these present and future debt service ceilings can be projected 
with amounts above them needing to be written down in one way or 
another. In principle (if not perhaps on the exact levels of ceilings)
How this is achieved is secondary. Literal writedown of capital 
amount, lowering interest rates, lengthening grace and repayment 
periods on low interest rate credits and back to back use of 
additional grants to repay past loans (as actually done by some Arab 
states and by Japan and more generally by some consultative groups in 
respect to IFI debt service) are all acceptable. The issue for 
African states should be not how much not how. Literal writeoffs (as 
used by the UK and Nordic states) may be simplest but if national 
considerations make the USA favour lengthening grace and repayment of 
3% loans or Japan favour providing additional cash grants for 
servicing to avoid formal writedowns, the added complexity is a price 
worth paying if substantial present and future debt service cuts are 
secured thereby.
One could think of the African countries themselves taking the 
initiative and organising a conference to which they would invite the 
creditors. However such an effort would be much more difficult to 
organise, and adequate attendance less likely than if the conference 
were organised by the United Nations the World Bank or the Global 
Coalition for Africa. Our strong recommendation is that an 
international conference on the African Debt should be held under the 
auspices of the World Bank or the Coalition, perhaps jointly with the 
ADB.
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this approach is very similar to ones advocated by some African states 
and analysts as far back as 1985. The problem is that, for whatever 
reason, the World Bank does not - or not yet - appear to give high 
priority to mobilising action toward implementing this approach. Were 
African states to launch an initiative along similar lines this might 
well lead to the Bank's moving present and future debt service 
abatement higher up on its priority list.
39 The fourth item on the Agenda should be environment. In that 
connection, and recognising the rapidly deteriorating condition of the 
human living environment, the most worrying aspect is the horrifyingly 
rapid process of desertification, deforestation and soil loss. Africa 
cannot afford the present rate of erosion to the economic foundation - 
its natural resource base - on which its future development largely 
depends. There are powerful interactions between population growth and 
development needs (especially food and employment) on one hand and the 
natural environment on the other and also between extreme poverty and 
environmental damage. The environmental management programme needed to 
deal with the situation must of necessity be a broad one, and should 
recognise poverty and rapid population growth as among the major 
factors in the environmental degradation now proceeding apace in much 
of Africa.
While most individual environmental projects will be of national 
nature, there is no doubt that a regional approach, based on 
cooperation in strategic planning, priority programme adoption, 
research and implementation, is essential, especially in respect to 
river basin, forest belt and desert margin zones which cross frontiers. 
This is not to say, of course, that individual countries should 
postpone action to establish environmental management until continental 
programmes and sub-regional have been agreed.
40 Obviously environmental degradation in Africa. including loss of 
wildlife, will also have negative aspects for the world as a whole even 
though the main loosers are Africans. The rest of the world should 
therefore take more interest in the situation especially in the 
"greenhouse effect" (global warming) and species diversity/wilderness 
protection implications of advancing deforestation as contrasted to 
sustainable long rotation logging soil conservation and agroforestry.
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But that interest should not take the form of isolated bits of support 
here and there; nor should it be confined to "wildlife" conservation. 
In particular it should be accepted that environmental management in 
Africa will be greatly facilitated by higher rates of economic growth 
and of poverty reduction. Their attainment would be made easier by 
better access to international markets on the part of African 
countries; as well as by easier access to external capital and 
technology with particular reference to eco-friendlv technology 
transfers at subsidised prices to enable Africa to industrialise less 
pollutingly than the North has.
In Africa - presumably as elsewhere - it needs to be recognised that 
only gainers will support environmental protection e.g. wildlife area 
residents who receive a share of tourist revenues, poor farmers who are 
paid now to carry out conservation and forestry works and will share in 
higher future crop and forest product yields. Incentives not coercion 
can build a mass base for eco-friendlv measures. In other words 
environmental considerations strengthen other arguments (economic, 
equity, etc.) which have been used in the past, and which remain 
legitimate, highlighting the importance of providing Africa with an 
"enabling environment" in its development efforts. However, African 
countries must not wait for the rest of the world to take supportive 
action. Individually and collectively they must, in spite of the 
constraints face them, give environmental management higher priority in 
all their development efforts. This also includes higher eco- 
friendliness standards for industry. It is no comfort to residents of 
- say - Cairo to know that their dirty air is harming Europe because it 
will not make access to non-polluting technology cheap; it is first and 
foremost Cairenes who fall ill or die prematurely because of the air 
pollution and their government which will, perforce, have to take the 
lead in pollution abatement.
41 In one respect the proposed regional agenda is very traditional in 
stressing the hang together or be hanged separately theme. In another 
it is non-standard:
i the proposed focus on common interests as the dynamic force with
common markets as instruments and with enhanced production as the 
goal and regional trade as a validating means diverge from the
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standard, imported common market/regional free trade model which 
has been described - perhaps a trifle unfairly - as "common 
market fetishism”.
ii therefore its sequencing (including its greater and medium as 
well as short term stress on sub-regional approaches) diverges 
from the letter (if not the spirit) of the Abuja Treaty.
iii and the stress on political prioretisation leads to a stress on 
coordinated action (not suprannationalism) , decentralisation of 
activities (to broaden the visibility of and support for the 
programme) and to a structure based on professional programme 
support units consequential on programme priorities (not a 
centralised secretariat based on some standard model) and a 
member state driven programme evolution (not one directed by a 
regional bureaucracy).
Each divergence is intended to relate to the very real weaknesses of 
the traditional approach, as only too clearly evidenced in its history 
in Africa.
CONCLUSION
42 In concluding this discussion a few words on the specific content of 
the proposed Agenda are in order. The Agenda items discussed in this 
monograph are highly selective and leave out some key ones - e.g. 
achievement of universal primary school education, primary health care 
and access to pure water; organised research in various key sectors 
(especially agriculture and industry); measures to expand domestic 
savings; promotion of appropriate technology; incorporation of gender 
considerations into all aspects of policy articulation and 
implementation. The authors readily accept that all these items, and 
others, are important and that they are not covered here except as they 
relate specifically to the issues highlighted in the Agenda. The 
present selection for this monograph was influenced by many 
considerations - the most important ones being to get African countries 
(and their leaders) to recognise (and to be alarmed by) the desperate 
situations and trends facing them and thereby to stress the imperative 
need for them to initiate appropriate action now, especially in those
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areas which would complement each other nationally and regionally - 
including but not limited to promotion of collective self-reliance - to 
deal with the crisis.
Directly related themes include the need to act promptly toward removal 
of obvious constraints to economic recovery; and to emphasise the 
importance of actually establishing as well as talking about regional 
solidarity economically and also politically (e.g. in conflict
resolution). Implementation of programmes in the areas indicated in 
this Agenda will doubtless be accompanied by (and will be conducive to 
making possible) action in other important areas not specifically
highlighted here. One of the most formidable challenges in Africa 
today is that action is desperately needed in all areas while resources 
are severely limited. Effective strategic planning, priority selection 
and sequencing is therefore essential to ensure that the resources 
available are used in a manner which makes an impact not spread so thin 
that very little progress is made in any area. President Nyerere's 
1969 warning is even truer today than when he made it in 1969: "To
plan is to choose, choose to go forward."
43 We would also like to stress that the imperative political and economic 
Agenda presented in this paper is based on the recognition of the 
crucial reality that Africa is very much on its own. In that regard - 
with the possible exceptions of South Africa, Egypt and Algeria - the 
continent appears to be of low and decreasing interest to most 
political and economic decision takers in the capitals of the developed 
countries. Africa's image abroad is increasingly that of a continent 
which has absorbed much aid and has nothing to show for it; a gloomy 
continent with so many serious internal problems that economic and 
social development seems a virtual impossibility. In other words it is
perceived as a continent destined to disaster. Not only can it be
ignored without much negative consequence, but it offers neither 
substantial economic or political opportunities for gains but a high 
probability that deep involvement will result in losses under both 
heads. What is relevant is not the extent to which this perception is 
accurate (as noted above given the external environment deterioration 
its 2% annual growth is above 1981 World Bank projections of what could 
be achieved with policy reform) but that so long as the perception 
exists and grows it does affect how external actors relate to Africa.
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There can be no doubt about this process of political and economic 
marginalisation of Africa - a process given big pushes forward by the 
protracted economic recession in the West, by conflicts in former 
communist states much closer to Europe; by the perceived economic and 
political attractions of NICs and China, as well as of selected 
countries within what used to be the USSR.
44 Lack of adequate external support for Africa is not due to lack of 
awareness, knowledge or information about severity of the various 
problems facing the continent. This point is adequately supported by 
examining the most important international exercise in the 1980s to 
examine Africa's economic and social crisis and to plan how to deal 
with i t . A f t e r  much preparation at the UN Headquarters, the 
headquarters of the Specialised Agencies and in Africa itself at the 
headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Organisation 
of African Unity, a UN Special Session of the General Assembly was held 
in 1986 to discuss Africa's Economic and Social Crisis. The result of 
the debate was the formulation of the UN Programme of Action for 
African Economic Recovery and Development (1986-90) - quite a
comprehensive programme which included a monitoring and review 
mechanism. But what has been the result? The UN Secretary-General has 
himself concluded "It must be recognised that it (the Programme) did 
not achieve its objective. The work has to be resumed".22
45 It is very clear that the international community (including the UN in 
spite of the spirited efforts of Dr. Boutros-Ghali) will not by itself 
put Africa on the road to recovery and development. In the 
international community we include the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. Admittedly the World Bank has an enormous role to plav
The World Bank has also, through its various reports, made a very 
major contribution to increasing knowledge and awareness about 
Africa's economic and social crisis. However, those report have been 
written within the framework of the World Bank's philosophy, policies 
and programme intentions - including the need to keep the donors "on 
board". It is no wonder then that some of the reports have generated 
vigorous negative responses from within Africa and elsewhere. In the 
process of often less than fully constructive dialogue better 
understanding of the African situation has actually been promoted. 
The criticisms have generated a significant 1981-1992 transformation 
(or structural adjustment) of Bank strategic perceptions on SSA not 
least in respect to the need for national initiatives toward, and 
"ownership" of, programmes to poverty reduction as an economic as 
well as a social and political priority and to health-education- 
nutrition as essential economic investment priorities.
The Secretary-General's speech to the meeting of the High-level Panel 
on African Development he appointed, Geneva, December 28, 1992.
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in dealing with Africa's economic and social crisis. But it has had no 
more success than the UN in generating the overall increase in resource 
flows it repeatedly stressed as essential over 1981-1989 and its 
present basic claim is that its efforts over the past decade have 
halted "freefall" in SSA, not that they have made sustained growth 
possible. That is a very modest claim - and also a reasonably accurate 
overall assessment. The Bank may be able to live with that limited 
success; African governments and Africans cannot. Overall growth of 4% 
and of per capita consumption of under 1% are too low to be sustainable 
- they will, after the recovery phase, tend to implode into political 
crisis and febrile policy fluctuation. Basically the lowest
sustainable rates are 6% for EDP and 2% for personal consumption (plus 
substantial poverty reduction). The potential role of IMF is much more 
limited. It is questionable whether the Fund's procedures and 
requirements in lending are appropriate to the African cases. The fact 
that there has been substantial reverse flows of resources from Africa 
to IMF in the last decade - a decade in which African countries were 
going through rapidly deteriorating economic circumstances - shows that 
there is something fundamentally wrong in IMF procedures, at least as 
far as countries in the stage of development now prevailing in Africa 
are concerned.
In fact the IMF has put itself - via SAF and ESAF - in the position of 
operating a mini IDA while being unable to serve its basic goal of 
being a lender of first resort to provide bridging finance promptly 
when an unprojectable shock hits a member's economy. There is no 
evident gain to SAF/ESAF being operated separately from IDA, though 
probably not much harm either. There is a need to re-enable SSA states 
with SAPs to have easy access to the first two tranches when shocks 
(terms of trade, natural disaster, market closure) hit them - events no 
less likely with a SAP and even less domestically handleable because 
virtually all SAP resources are committed in advance and at levels 
below those even the World Bank thought to be the prudent minimum 
required.
One route would be for SAP countries (and other low/lower middle income 
with less than two tranches of IMF drawings) access on the old "gold 
tranche" terms of evidence of sudden legitimate need plus a plausible 
set of medium terms corrective measures with a) 1% annual charge to
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countries with under - say - $1,000 per capita GDP and b) a commitment 
to seek to refinance the drawing (to repay it) at the next annual 
consultative group meeting.
The record of other specialised UN agencies in Africa is mixed from 
utterly disastrous to highly effective. The most effective have 
substantial decentralisation, country programmes (and situation 
analyses) built up jointly by country offices and host governments, a 
clear perspective on how their specialised objectives fit into overall 
strategy, willingness and ability to take regional and sub-regional 
perspectives and initiatives in collaboration or formal joint 
sponsorship with African governments and regional organisations - e.g. 
UNICEF. UNDP - despite very serious efforts to fit into African 
strategies and to increase national capacity - has special problems. 
Its roles of coordinator for all UN agencies, financial intermediary 
for some of their activities and being a competing provider of
technical assistance services itself are less than compatible, and it 
appears to be less than clear to UNDP whether its duty is to act as a 
government empowering body focusing on national priorities or as the 
technical assistance arm of the World Bank within its priority 
framework. In any case neither UNDP nor - much more - any other
specialised agency has the range of concerns or the financial muscle to 
take an overall lead role in African development as opposed to a 
significant supporting one.
It is clear that the World Bank can and must provide a major supporting
role, it will not, by itself, be the one to organise and implement
effective programmes of action by itself.^ And, of course, no one 
should expect, or even wish, the bilateral donors to do that job - they 
clearly lack the required capacity to design national strategies or to 
coordinate with each other, quite apart from the evident facts of
The Bank increasingly recognises this. In mid 1992 its Vice 
President for Africa specifically stressed that its role was to 
respond to, advise in, support African initiative, not to act as a 
central planning agency or Ministry of Finance for Africa.
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conflicts of interests and inconsistency inherent in external taking of 
basic social, political and economic strategic and policy decisions for 
Africans.
46 When one examines the situation carefully on the basis of these 
considerations and the experiences of the last 12 years or so, it is 
clear that in spite of the many institutions and NGOs now pronouncing 
themselves frequently and loudly as to what should be done about 
Africa's problems, particularly those of sub-Saharan Africa, Africans 
have to work out their own "salvation". This has, in turn, two 
fundamental implications: first coordinated action, as advocated in
this monograph, is absolutely essential - it is either coordinated 
action or collapse. Second, a political strategy is needed to ensure 
coordinated national and regional actions for common survival and a 
relaunching of development. In that regard it is strongly recommended 
that African countries should organise a non-routine Summit with the 
same commitment as the Summit held in Cairo in 1963 which formulated 
the OAU Charter, but followed by more systematic articulation, action 
and regular review of results. This extraordinary Summit should not 
aim at adopting the kind of document produced at Lagos Summit in 1981 
or its successor the Abuja Summit in 1992 (a rather vague plan for 
establishment of an African Common Market, which was equally vaguely 
reaffirmed at the June 1993 Summit in Cairo) . The aim should be to 
formulate and agree on a collective political and political economic 
framework and strategy for ensuring African survival and resumed 
development through coordinated initiatives and self-reliance 
programmes. The formulation of that framework and strategy is the task 
which African politicians, entrepreneurs, planners, intellectuals and 
professionals need first to come to perceive as the most significant 
challenge now facing them and then to act together to address. No 
other continent or country, no global institution and very few non 
African individuals are primarily concerned with and working with and 
for Africa and Africans. Nor, unlike African governments and persons, 
do they have to live with the results of decisions taken (or not 
taken) . "To plan today and fly away is to live to plan another day" 
may be an efficient - even if brutally cynical - motto for most 
technical assistance personnel, and for most expatriates more 
generally, but is not an option open to very many individual Africans 
nor to any African states.
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47 The building blocks for the proposed collective self-reliance 
programmes must be the sub-regional cooperation mechanisms - such as
ECOWAS, PTA, SADC, ECCA. A wholly continental and wholly vague paper 
programme - such as the Lagos Plan of Action or the Abuja Declaration -
could add little to long existing declarations of intentions. What is
needed are practical and guick starting programmes of action. These 
are more easily formulated for neighbouring countries and in a 
perspective much broader than that of traditional Northern common 
market theory and practice and also within an institutional frame fully 
incorporating national bodies at all stages. However the sub-regional 
mechanisms are unlikely to go far enough, or to relate constructively 
to each other, without a firm continental political mechanism for 
urging and encouraging maintenance of momentum. A continental 
mechanism would also be useful in resolving disagreements at sub­
regional levels quickly and before they become disruptive. The 
continental political mechanism suggested must be based on "continental 
nationalism" and firm binding agreement by all countries of the 
regional necessarily grounded on "domestic nationalism" and state 
involvement throughout the decision taking and implementing process not 
on a romantic or technocratic "great leap forward" to unattainable 
centralised supranationalism guided by technocratic bureaucrats.
48 The conclusions reached here do not mean, of course, that Africa should 
forget the rest of the world. Obviously it should not. Not only would 
that be not in its interest, but Africa could not in reality delink 
itself. What is proposed here is that Africa should not primarily 
concentrate, as it has been doing so far, on arguing its case abroad 
and pleading for donor support and changes in the international 
economic order as opposed to constructing new national, sub-regional 
and regional ones in Africa. Nor should it continue to believe that 
history will, somehow provide a solution, or that the force of "natural 
justice" will prevail some time in future. Instead of that rather 
wistful pair of illusions and of continued preoccupation with 
explaining its circumstances to the rest of the world, Africa should 
embark on doing, on its own, all it can to ensure its survival and 
development.
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Africa and other developing regions should, of course, continue to
fight for equity in the functioning of the international egpnomic
system. But as they do that they should know that the more success is 
achieved in collective self-reliance efforts the earlier will there be 
more positive responses from those interests now preventing the 
establishment of a more equitable international economic order. 
Therefore; Africa must not wait for a more favourable external 
environment to be established; it must recognise the need for immediate 
and adequate action on its part to safeguard its survival and to create 
an enabling environment for global structural adjustment proposals to 
be taken seriously. The Agenda presented here is quite explicitly 
designed to assist in arousing the continent to a more realistic 
strategy and programme in its efforts to achieve economic recovery and 
growth for the benefit of its people including both present and future 
generations.
48 Finally it is necessary to face the thorniest procedural question of 
all: assuming that the proposed Agenda is broadly acceptable, who is
to initiate the needed discussions and negotiations between African 
countries? Who, among African leaders, is to make the first move? 
This is not an easy question to answer: but in thinking about it one
is reminded that the preparations and struggles for political 
independence in Africa (and elsewhere) depended on a few individual 
leaders who inspired others and the masses of the people in general. 
Those leaders - such as Ahmed Ben Bella, Jomo Kenyatta, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, Kwame Nkurumah, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure - 
were truly nationalistic and courageous people who were prepared to lay 
down their own lives in order to secure dignity for their people and 
countries. That tradition has been repeated in Southern Africa: 
Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, Hosea Kutako, Sam Nujoma, Augustino 
Neto, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Robert Mugabe and Seretse Khama 
are on its role of honour. Not incidentally the launching of SADC was 
a top personal priority for President Khama over the last year of his 
life involving the hosting of both the Arusha and the Lusaka founding 
conferences and substantial deployment of his Vice President, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and senior officials in diplomatic and technical 
preparations. Africa is in desperate need of such leadership today by 
persons of courage, self-denial, commitment, vision, intelligence and 
African patriotism. Most collective self-reliance programmes will have
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to be articulated and undertaken at the sub-regional levels and 
implementation will be largely coordinated national. With that in mind 
is it too much to hope that each sub-reaion of the continent could find 
at least one leader who would then initiate and help to inform and 
guide the process of emancipating these countries from the stranglehold 
of existing economic and political strategies - strategies which will 
perpetuate these countries' poverty and external dependence? Can 
Africa not find (can it afford not to find) four or five leaders to 
initiate the struggle for emancipating these countries from what - 
however intended or caused - is objectively deepening neo-colonialism? 
Surely, there must be at least that number of present senior leaders 
and elder statesmen to lead?
But it is necessary to repeat that “turning Africa round" is a
challenge to all its politicians, professionals. senior officials,
managers, journalists - to all those with leadership responsibilities 
in the public, social or enterprise walks of life. Fortunately for 
Africa serious leaders are normally respected and their lead followed. 
In the past this valuable asset has been abused only too frequently. 
The prayer now is that the asset remains and can still be used by 
dedicated leaders to enable people to advance toward dignity and 
prosperity.
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